Part Two — 1853-Current
How Far We've Fallen:
How Iowa's Laws and Courts Turned Our Founding Principles Upside Down
Statutes, case, law, doctrines, and procedural gatekeeping that built up over the years,
creating an inverted version of the state our founders intended

By Sondra Wilson | Updated October 8, 2026

 

 

 

Table of Contents — Part Two
How Far We've Fallen: 
How Iowa's Laws and Courts Turned Our Founding Principles Upside Down

 

Introduction — How Iowa's Legal System Became Difficult to Challenge

What Happens When an Iowan Seeks Justice?

The Right to Trial by Jury: From Legislative Protection to Judicial Restriction (1853–2023)

Judicial Immunity: Judges Have "Absolute Immunity" Even When Performing "Malicious and Corrupt" Acts (1969–1977)

Government Immunity: The Iowa Tort Claims Act and Its Exceptions

Prosecutorial Immunity: When Prosecutors Are Protected from Civil Liability

Qualified Immunity: When Violating a Right Does Not Produce a Damages Remedy

Constitutional Rights Without Damages: From Godfrey to Burnett (2017–2023)

Walling Out Independent and Third-Party Candidates (1998–2026)

The Lawsuit That Never Reaches Trial: Procedural Barriers and Access to Justice

When Government Harms You: What Remedies Actually Remain?

Conclusion — How Far We've Fallen, and Why Constitutional Reform Is Being Proposed

Endnotes and Primary Sources

 

 

---

 

What Happens When an Iowan Seeks Justice?

 

Some of the legal concepts examined in this investigation may seem abstract or unfamiliar.

Terms such as equitable jurisdiction, judicial immunity, sovereign immunity, and dismissal with prejudice are not part of most Iowans' everyday vocabulary.

But their consequences are profound, and should be known by all Iowans so that the majority can understand what has been quietly happening in Iowa's coruts.

Here are some basic terms for understanding this next section:

Criminal cases involve government prosecution of someone accused of violating criminal law. A conviction may result in imprisonment, fines, probation, or other penalties.

Civil cases generally involve disputes over legal rights, financial compensation, property, contracts, or other remedies. A citizen alleging that a government official caused them harm may attempt to bring a civil lawsuit seeking damages.

Cases at law traditionally included civil claims seeking monetary compensation and other forms of legal relief, with a right to trial by jury in qualifying proceedings.

Cases in equity traditionally involved remedies such as injunctions—court orders requiring someone to do something or stop doing something. Such cases were ordinarily decided by judges rather than juries.

These categories matter because the type of case can determine whether the citizen has a right to a jury.

And even before the court reaches that question, another obstacle may arise.

Governmental immunity refers to legal doctrines that protect governmental bodies or officials from particular lawsuits or forms of liability.

Depending on the doctrine and circumstances, a lawsuit may be dismissed even though the plaintiff alleges serious misconduct.

Consider what that means.

A citizen believes a government official has violated their rights. They gather documents, identify witnesses, prepare evidence, and file a lawsuit.

But before those witnesses testify—or before a jury ever examines the evidence—the defendant argues that the law protects them from being sued.

If the court agrees, the claim may be dismissed.

The court may never decide whether the alleged misconduct actually occurred. It may instead decide that the law does not permit the plaintiff to obtain the requested remedy through that lawsuit.

This distinction is crucial.

A dismissed lawsuit does not necessarily establish that the government official acted lawfully.

Nor does it necessarily establish that the citizen's allegations were false.

Sometimes, it means that the legal system has determined that the defendant cannot be held liable under the claim being brought.

And when a case is dismissed with prejudice, the plaintiff ordinarily cannot bring that same claim again.

These rules are not merely technicalities. They help determine whether ordinary people can obtain a hearing, establish what happened, and receive a remedy when their rights have been violated.

The following sections examine how Iowa's courts and lawmakers developed these doctrines, how they operate today, and whether their cumulative effects remain consistent with the constitutional promise that government exists for the protection, security, and benefit of the people.

---

 

1853-2023
The Right to Trial by Jury:
From Legislative Protection to Judicial Restriction

Nearly 170 years have passed since Iowans adopted their current state constitution.

The founders declared that government existed for the protection, security, and benefit of the people. They guaranteed fundamental rights, including due process, freedom of speech, and trial by jury.

But what happens when the government itself violates those rights?

Most Iowans are familiar with the idea that no one is above the law. Far fewer have encountered the legal doctrines that determine when a government official can actually be held responsible for violating it.

Some of these protections are centuries old. Others have been established, expanded, or reaffirmed through more recent legislation and judicial decisions.

The stated purpose of governmental immunity is to preserve independent decision-making, prevent endless litigation, and allow public officials to perform their duties without constant fear of personal liability.

But these reality of these laws, from a citizen's perspective, is that they are usually only discovered after the citizen his been harmed. It is then that they learn there is almost no way to hold the government officials accountable. 

And the actual language of some of Iowa's laws may surprise readers.

1849-1885:
Iowa's Judiciary Cut Off Citizens' Rights to Trial by Jury

Iowa's Constitution makes an unequivocal promise:

"The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate."

— Iowa Constitution, Article I, Section 9.

Inviolate means something that must not be violated, infringed, or diminished.

But what does that guarantee mean when the legislature and courts can expand the categories of civil cases that are decided without juries?

The historical record reveals how Iowa's lawmakers established broad jury-trial language—and how subsequent judicial decisions restricted its reach.

1853:
The Legislature Declared That Either Party May Demand a Jury
in All District Court Cases

On January 24, 1853, Iowa's Fourth General Assembly enacted Chapter 90, titled Trial by Jury.

Section 1 declared:

"That in all cases in the district court either party may demand a trial by jury; and jury fees in said courts are hereby abolished." [28]

The legislature did not write "in criminal cases only."

It did not write "in actions at law, but not equity."

It wrote "in all cases in the district court."

This was not merely a philosophical statement about the importance of juries. It was enacted legislation, adopted four years before Iowans ratified their present constitution.

The 1857 Constitution subsequently preserved the declaration that the jury right "shall remain inviolate."

It also provided in Article V, Section 6, that district courts would exercise both legal and equitable jurisdiction as distinct and separate jurisdictions.

The resulting historical question is direct: If the legislature had already declared that either party could demand a jury in all district-court cases, what authority did subsequent courts have to interpret that language as excluding an entire category of proceedings?

What Does it Mena When a Case Is Heard in Equity?

In the nineteenth century, American courts distinguished between cases at law and cases in equity.

Cases at law generally involved remedies such as monetary damages and, in qualifying circumstances, trial by jury.

Cases in equity generally involved remedies such as injunctions, historically decided by judges without juries as of right.

The distinction sounds technical, but its consequences are substantial.

Whether a lawsuit is classified as legal or equitable can determine whether ordinary citizens have the right to decide disputed facts—or whether those decisions are left to judges.

And as Iowa's subsequent court decisions demonstrate, the power to define which cases belong in equity became an important part of the legal history of jury-trial restrictions.

1868:
The Iowa Supreme Court Restricted the Meaning of "All Cases"

Fifteen years later, that question reached the Iowa Supreme Court.

In State for Use of Boone County v. Orwig, 25 Iowa 280 (1868), litigants invoked the 1853 statute and the constitutional guarantee to argue that they were entitled to a jury in an equitable proceeding.

The Iowa Supreme Court rejected their argument.

Rather than treating the statute's reference to "all cases" as extending jury rights to all district-court proceedings, the court construed it as a measure eliminating jury fees.

The court stated:

"Now, we hold and construe the law of 1852-3 to be simply a repeal of these provisions, by declaring that a party should have a right of trial by jury in all cases, without being required to pay in advance a fee of three dollars, or to pay it at all." [29]

Consider what happened.

The legislature enacted language allowing either party to demand a jury in all district-court cases. The Iowa Supreme Court subsequently ruled that the law did not give parties an absolute jury right in equity.

The court relied on the historical distinction between cases at law and cases in equity, and it concluded that neither the old nor the new constitution required juries in equitable suits.

Yet the constitutional text itself did not expressly say that its guarantee disappeared whenever a dispute was classified as equitable.

The limitation came from the court's interpretation of the historically protected jury right.

1868:
Even When a Jury Was Used, Judges Could Disregard Its Findings in Equity

That same year, the Iowa Supreme Court decided Chambers v. Ingham, 25 Iowa 222.

A jury had considered factual disputes concerning a business partnership.

But the Supreme Court explained that because the proceeding was equitable, the jury's findings did not bind the reviewing court.

Chief Justice John F. Dillon wrote:

"The cause is in equity and triable by the first method. Notwithstanding the special finding of the jury, the cause is to be tried in this court de novo." [30]

In plain English, the judges could independently reconsider the facts rather than accept the jury's findings as controlling.

Thus, even where citizens were permitted to participate in determining facts, their verdicts could be advisory rather than binding.

1869:
Another Iowa Supreme Court Decision Warns Against Judicial Encroachment

The following year, the Iowa Supreme Court decided McMartin v. Bingham, 27 Iowa 234.

The dispute concerned an ordinary claim for payment for legal services. The trial court had attempted to send the matter to a referee rather than allow the requested jury trial.

The Supreme Court reversed.

Justice Chester C. Cole wrote:

"But it is better to suffer the inconvenience and delay resulting from a jury trial of such causes than to narrow in the least by judicial construction the invaluable right of trial by jury." [31]

This is a remarkable statement when compared with Iowa's later decisions.

The court expressly rejected judicial efficiency as a sufficient justification for narrowing the constitutional jury right.

But McMartin also recognized the established exception for proceedings genuinely within equitable jurisdiction.

The evolving distinction was consequential: whether a case belonged to law or equity could determine whether ordinary Iowans possessed the right to have a jury decide the facts.

1885:
The Iowa Supreme Court Recognizes Legislative Power to Expand Cases Without Juries

In Littleton v. Fritz, 65 Iowa 488 (1885), the court considered legislation allowing civil injunctions against establishments accused of unlawfully selling alcohol.

The case arose during Iowa's politically contested campaign to prohibit liquor sales.

The legislation permitted certain enforcement proceedings to be brought in equity rather than through ordinary criminal prosecution.

The court upheld that framework.

Of particular importance, it rejected a historically fixed interpretation of the constitutional jury guarantee and recognized legislative power to enlarge equitable jurisdiction.[32]

This introduced a consequential principle into Iowa constitutional law.

If the legislature could expand the jurisdiction of equity, and equity cases carried no jury right, then legislative decisions about the classification of civil proceedings could determine whether citizens received juries.

The legal distinction between law and equity had existed for centuries. What mattered here was the judiciary's recognition that the legislature could alter the practical reach of the jury guarantee by expanding equitable jurisdiction.

The decision provided a precedent for later courts to uphold civil proceedings without jury trials even when those proceedings carried serious consequences.

2023:
The Iowa Supreme Court Reaffirms the Power to Exclude Juries from Equitable Cases

Nearly 140 years later, the issue returned to the Iowa Supreme Court in State ex rel. Attorney General v. Autor, No. 21-0831 (2023).

The Iowa Attorney General had brought a civil consumer-fraud enforcement action seeking substantial financial remedies, including monetary penalties.

The defendants demanded a jury.

The Attorney General moved to strike that demand because Iowa Code §714.16(7) required the state's civil enforcement action to proceed in equity.

The district court struck the jury demand.

The defendants appealed.

The Iowa Supreme Court unanimously upheld the decision excluding the jury.

Relying on Littleton and subsequent precedent, the court concluded that Iowa's Constitution does not guarantee juries in cases within equitable jurisdiction.

It reaffirmed the legislature's power to expand the range of proceedings handled in equity.[33]

The court also rejected the defendants' alternative request to have a jury determine liability while the judge decided the remedies.

Consequently, the defendants could face substantial civil financial penalties without a jury possessing the authority to decide their liability.

The Constitutional Question Iowans Deserve to Consider

Look at the historical progression.

In 1853, Iowa's legislature declared that either party could demand a jury in "all cases in the district court."

In 1857, Iowans ratified a constitution declaring the jury right inviolate.

In 1868, the Iowa Supreme Court construed the 1853 legislation as not extending that right to all equitable cases.

In 1885, the court recognized the legislature's authority to enlarge equitable jurisdiction.

And in 2023, the Iowa Supreme Court reaffirmed that authority while upholding the exclusion of a jury from a civil enforcement proceeding involving substantial monetary consequences.

The text of the constitutional jury guarantee remained unchanged. But the legal rules governing which cases qualify for a jury developed through legislative decisions and judicial interpretation.

This is not simply a question about lawyers, judges, or courtroom efficiency.

Trial by jury places ordinary citizens between the government and the person against whom governmental power is being exercised.

When a jury is unavailable, judges rather than fellow citizens resolve the disputed facts.

There are legitimate historical reasons for assigning certain remedies to courts of equity. But that does not settle how far the legislature should be allowed to extend equitable jurisdiction without diminishing the constitutional protection of jury trials.

The question remains:

When Iowa's Constitution promises that the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, should the government be able to expand the categories of cases in which that right does not apply?

And if Iowans disagree with the judiciary's interpretation, Article I, Section 2 reminds us that the ultimate authority to reform the government remains with the people.

---

 

1969–1977
Judicial Immunity:
Judges Have "Absolute Immunity" Even When Performing "Malicious and Corrupt" Acts

 

Consider the Iowa Supreme Court's 1977 decision in Blanton v. Barrick, 258 N.W.2d 306.

The court explained that judicial immunity protects judges from civil damages for qualifying judicial acts, even when those acts are alleged to have been malicious or corrupt.

The decision expressly discussed immunity in circumstances involving accusations of malice and corruption.[15]

The court's reasoning was based on judicial independence: judges must be free to decide cases without fearing that every dissatisfied litigant will subsequently sue them personally.

However, this immunity is not entirely without limits. It generally applies to judicial acts performed within the applicable jurisdictional framework, not every action a judge might take.

Earlier Iowa decisions demonstrate how far this doctrine can reach.

In Huendling v. Jensen (1969), the Iowa Supreme Court protected a judicial officer notwithstanding allegations involving improper use of criminal process.

In Osbekoff v. Mallory (1971), the court reaffirmed that a judge may enjoy immunity despite acting from improper motives or exceeding authority, while also recognizing an important exception where a magistrate acts wholly without jurisdiction.[16]

These decisions raise an important question:

If an official's conduct is alleged to be malicious or corrupt, should the official's judicial position alone prevent the injured person from obtaining civil damages?

Judicial independence is necessary. But so is judicial accountability. Whether Iowa has appropriately balanced those principles deserves public examination.

 

---

 

 

1969–1977
Iowa Tort Claims Act and Municipal Tort Claims Act:
The State and Its Employees May Not Be Held Liable, in their Official or Personal Capacities,
for Misrepresentation, Deceit, False Arrest, False Imprisonment, Malicious Prosecution, Abuse of Process, or Other Corrupt and Abusive Acts

Perhaps one of the most revealing examples is found directly in the Iowa Code.

Chapter 669, the Iowa Tort Claims Act, establishes circumstances under which the state may be sued for damages arising from governmental conduct.

But the Act also contains numerous exceptions.

Consider Iowa Code §669.14(4).

It excludes claims against the state arising from a list of intentional torts, including:

"false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit"

The full subsection also includes assault, battery, and interference with contract rights.[19]

Read that again.

A law governing claims against the government expressly excludes categories that include some of the very forms of wrongdoing citizens might most urgently seek protection against.

Section 669.14(1) also excludes certain claims involving discretionary governmental functions, including those where discretion is abused.[20]

These provisions do not declare false imprisonment, deceit, or abuse of governmental authority lawful.

What they do is restrict the state's exposure to damages under this statute, even in circumstances involving allegations of serious misconduct.

And the law contains another important protection.

Under §669.23:

"Employees of the state are not personally liable for any claim which is exempted under section 669.14." [21]

Taken together, these provisions raise a consequential question: if both the state and its employees are protected from particular civil damages claims, where does the injured citizen turn?

There may be other remedies, depending on the conduct, the official's role, and applicable federal or state law. But those remedies must be identified and pursued separately, and they are not always available.

 

 

2019
Prosecutors Have "Judicial Process Immunity" If They Knowingly Prosecute Innocent People,
or If Choose Not to Enforce Laws

The immunity doctrines do not stop with judges.

In Venckus v. City of Iowa City (2019), the Iowa Supreme Court considered a lawsuit brought by a man acquitted of sexual abuse charges.

Joshua Venckus alleged that prosecutors and a police investigator had continued pursuing a criminal case despite information he believed demonstrated his innocence.

He brought various claims, including malicious prosecution, abuse of process, defamation, and violations of the Iowa Constitution.

The Supreme Court held that judicial-process immunity barred most of the claims against the prosecutors and county, while allowing certain claims against the police defendants to proceed beyond the pleading stage.[17]

The case later returned to the Iowa Supreme Court. In 2023, the court affirmed summary judgment on the remaining claims against the police detective and the city.[18]

The decisions did not establish that every action alleged by Venckus was unlawful, nor did they immunize every defendant from every claim.

But they demonstrate how legal immunity can narrow a lawsuit before the underlying allegations are fully tried.

This raises another question:

When a person believes public officials have wrongfully subjected them to criminal prosecution, what meaningful avenues of accountability remain available?

Qualified Immunity:
The Difficulty of Establishing a Right to Relief

In 2021, Iowa enacted additional statutory qualified-immunity provisions.

Iowa Code §669.14A protects state employees from monetary liability under the Act in specified circumstances where the allegedly violated right was not clearly established.

It also requires plaintiffs bringing covered claims alleging violations of law to plead with particularity, and provides for dismissal with prejudice when the required allegations are insufficient.[22]

This presents a practical challenge.

A person's ability to obtain damages can depend not merely on whether governmental conduct was unlawful, but also on whether the relevant legal rule was already sufficiently clear at the time of the conduct.

Supporters of qualified immunity argue that officials should not face personal damages for violating legal rules they could not reasonably have known.

Critics argue that this approach can prevent accountability for harmful conduct, particularly where courts have not previously addressed closely comparable circumstances.

The underlying issue is whether the law provides an effective remedy when government acts outside lawful limits.

 

 

 

---

 

 

 

1998-Present
Walling Out Iowans from Our Elections

1998:
Iowa Public Television Defined as "Government-Owned Media"
and Allowed to Exclude Third-Party and Independent Candidates from Political Debates

In 1998, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ruled in Marcus v. Iowa Public Television, 150 F.3d 924, that Iowa Public Television—a government-owned broadcasting agency—was not required to include third-party candidates in its televised congressional debates.

Iowa Public Television had invited Democratic and Republican candidates to participate while excluding several third-party candidates because it did not consider them sufficiently newsworthy.

The excluded candidates challenged that decision in federal court.

But the court upheld Iowa Public Television's decision, applying a U.S. Supreme Court ruling that classified candidate debates organized by government-owned broadcasters as nonpublic forums.

In other words, even though Iowa Public Television was publicly owned, its political debates were not considered public forums that every qualified candidate had a right to enter.

The court allowed the broadcaster to exclude candidates as long as the selection criteria were reasonable and did not discriminate against particular political viewpoints.[24]

Think about what that means: A government-owned television station could organize an election debate, invite Democratic and Republican candidates, exclude third-party candidates, and have that exclusion upheld in federal court.

The court did not require Iowa Public Television to give every qualified candidate an equal opportunity to participate.

This raises an important question: When government-owned media decides which candidates the public gets to hear from, who ensures that voters—not governmental institutions—ultimately control the political process?

[24] Marcus v. Iowa Public Television, 150 F.3d 924 (8th Cir. 1998), applying Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998). The court described IPTV as a government-owned public television broadcaster and upheld the exclusion of third-party candidates from its 1996 congressional candidate debates.

 

 

---

 

 

2023
No Monetary Damages for Constitutional Rights Violations

In 2017, the Iowa Supreme Court decided Godfrey v. State, recognizing the possibility of pursuing certain damages claims directly under the Iowa Constitution.

Six years later, the court reversed that development.

In Burnett v. Smith (2023), the Iowa Supreme Court overruled Godfrey, holding that courts would no longer recognize a standalone claim for monetary damages under the Iowa Constitution without authorization from the common law, legislation, or the constitution's express terms. [23]

The court reasoned that creating damages remedies was not generally the judiciary's responsibility and that Godfrey had departed from the state's established constitutional framework.

The significance is considerable.

The Iowa Constitution establishes rights that government must respect. But under Burnett, a violation of those rights does not automatically entitle the injured person to monetary compensation.

Other remedies—including injunctions, statutory claims, and federal civil-rights litigation—may still be available.

Yet the distinction between possessing a constitutional right and possessing an enforceable damages remedy is one that every Iowan deserves to understand.

Rights Without Remedies?

These cases and statutes govern different subjects. Some involve judicial independence; others involve sovereign immunity, criminal prosecutions, constitutional damages, or political speech.

They also have different origins. Several doctrines predate Iowa's founding, while others reflect subsequent decisions by Iowa courts and legislators.

They should not all be treated as a single legal rule or assumed to arise from the same political motivations.

Nevertheless, they expose a recurring issue:

A person may possess a legal right, believe that right has been violated, and still encounter laws that prevent a particular remedy or shield an official from civil damages.

Iowa's Constitution declares that government exists for the protection, security, and benefit of the people.

The central question is whether the state's present legal framework provides sufficient accountability to fulfill that promise.

And if Iowans conclude that it does not, their constitution expressly recognizes the people's authority to reform their government.

Continued in Part Three: The People's Constitutional Power to Reform Iowa's Government.

 

 

---

 

Court "Rules" Create a Media Blackout

Imagine suffering a serious injustice, only to discover that the legal system you were taught would protect your rights is nearly impossible to navigate without professional help.

You cannot afford a lawyer. You are already struggling to pay rent, buy groceries, keep the heat on, or cover medical expenses. Yet the law has imposed deadlines, and the clock is running.

So you begin teaching yourself how to navigate Iowa's courts.

You study hundreds of procedural and evidentiary rules, search for legal definitions, research decades of judicial decisions, gather evidence, and prepare your own filings.

Eventually, you file your lawsuit, believing you will finally have an opportunity to present what happened.

Instead, opposing counsel files a motion to dismiss, supported by legal doctrines and judicial precedents you may never have encountered.

Suddenly, you are fighting not simply to prove that an injustice occurred, but to persuade the court that you are legally entitled to have the controversy heard at all.

Your lawsuit may be dismissed before any witnesses testify or a jury examines your evidence.

And depending on the circumstances, you may be ordered to pay court costs arising from the very proceeding in which you sought relief.

Imagine suffering harm at the hands of government, being denied a remedy through your lawsuit, and then having to pay costs associated with the proceeding.

This is not an abstract concern for me.

I have personally experienced the extraordinary difficulty of navigating Iowa's courts without counsel, and I have heard from other Iowans who describe similar struggles.

What concerns me is how little public attention these cases may receive. Allegations of severe wrongdoing can remain unresolved because a lawsuit ends on procedural or immunity grounds, without the public ever hearing the evidence that the injured person intended to present.

We hear about major trials. But how often do we hear about the lawsuits that never make it that far?

A case dismissed under an immunity doctrine is not necessarily a case in which the government was found to have done nothing wrong. Sometimes, the court has determined that the plaintiff cannot obtain the requested remedy without ever resolving the underlying allegations.

That distinction should concern every Iowan.

We Must Make Justice Accessible Again

I believe Iowa's judicial system has developed a profound imbalance between ordinary citizens and the legal professionals who know how to navigate it.

And I believe we have paid far too little attention to what happens inside our courts.

That is why I developed the Justice Accessibility Act, a proposal to simplify unnecessarily complicated court procedures, make controlling law publicly searchable and understandable, expand assistance for self-represented citizens, and provide meaningful opportunities to correct harmless procedural errors before potentially valid claims are lost.

I have also proposed teaching practical law to Iowa high-school students, so young people enter adulthood understanding how to preserve evidence, recognize legal deadlines, navigate governmental institutions, and protect their rights before a crisis occurs.

These proposals address part of the accessibility problem.

But making the system easier to understand will not, by itself, correct laws and judicial doctrines that prevent citizens from obtaining meaningful redress.

That is why this investigation goes further.

It examines what Iowa's courts and lawmakers have actually established, what rights and remedies have been restricted, and whether the legal system that developed under our Constitution still fulfills its promise to the people.

I believe our judicial institutions have strayed so far from that promise that calling it straying may itself be an understatement.

When a legal system becomes exceptionally effective at protecting governmental authority, yet ordinary citizens struggle to obtain a hearing and a meaningful remedy when that authority causes harm, we must confront whether the system has betrayed its constitutional purpose.

And I believe it is time for Iowans to start paying as much attention to our courts as we do to our governors and legislators.

 

 

---

 

When Government Harms Citizens, Do Any Remedies Actually Remain?

 

 

Endnotes

 

[15] Blanton v. Barrick, 258 N.W.2d 306, 308–09 (Iowa 1977). Judicial immunity and its application to allegations of malicious or corrupt conduct.

[16] Huendling v. Jensen, 168 N.W.2d 745 (Iowa 1969); Osbekoff v. Mallory, 188 N.W.2d 294 (Iowa 1971). Judicial immunity and its jurisdictional limits.

[17] Venckus v. City of Iowa City, 930 N.W.2d 792 (Iowa 2019). Judicial-process immunity concerning prosecutors and other defendants.

[18] Venckus v. City of Iowa City, 990 N.W.2d 800 (Iowa 2023). Subsequent decision concerning remaining common-law and constitutional claims.

[19] Iowa Code §669.14(4) (2025). Exceptions for specified intentional torts under the Iowa Tort Claims Act.

[20] Iowa Code §669.14(1) (2025). Discretionary-function exception, including the statutory language concerning abuse of discretion.

[21] Iowa Code §669.23 (2025). Personal-liability protections for employees concerning claims exempted by §669.14.

[22] Iowa Code §669.14A (2025), enacted by 2021 Iowa Acts chapter 183, §12. Qualified immunity and associated pleading requirements.

[23] Godfrey v. State, 898 N.W.2d 844 (Iowa 2017); Burnett v. Smith, 990 N.W.2d 289 (Iowa 2023). Recognition and subsequent rejection of standalone constitutional damages claims.

[24] Marcus v. Iowa Public Television, 161 F.3d 619 (8th Cir. 1998); Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998). Candidate debates and the First Amendment's nonpublic-forum doctrine.

[25] The Debates of the Constitutional Convention of the State of Iowa, vol. I (Davenport: Luse, Lane & Co., 1857), p. 609, remarks of John T. Clark, February 19, 1857, concerning amendments and constitutional conventions.

[26] Ibid., pp. 622–623, remarks of James C. Traer, February 19, 1857.

[27] Ibid., p. 606, remarks of David Bunker, February 19, 1857, concerning the periodic submission of the constitutional convention question to voters.

[28] Fourth Iowa General Assembly, 1853 Iowa Acts, Chapter 90, §1, p. 148, approved January 24, 1853, An Act in Relation to Trial by Jury. Original legislative text: https://publications.iowa.gov/50595/1/1852_Iowa_Acts_GA_4_.pdf

[29] State for Use of Boone County v. Orwig, 25 Iowa 280, 287–289 (1868). The court interpreted the 1853 statute as abolishing jury fees rather than extending an absolute jury right into equity. The chief justice's separate reasoning also addressed the historical distinction between law and equity.

[30] Chambers v. Ingham, 25 Iowa 222, 225–226 (1868), opinion of Chief Justice John F. Dillon, holding that jury findings in an equitable proceeding did not bind the reviewing court.

[31] McMartin v. Bingham, 27 Iowa 234, 238–239 (1869), opinion of Justice Chester C. Cole, rejecting the compulsory reference of an ordinary legal claim in violation of the jury right.

[32] Littleton v. Fritz, 65 Iowa 488, 22 N.W. 641, 643–645 (1885). The court upheld legislation expanding equitable nuisance proceedings and rejected the argument that such expansion necessarily violated the constitutional jury guarantee.

[33] State ex rel. Attorney General v. Autor, No. 21-0831 (Iowa May 26, 2023), amended July 25, 2023, pp. 6–8, 20–21. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the order striking the jury demand and relied on Littleton in discussing the legislature's authority over equitable jurisdiction. Iowa Judicial Branch: https://www.iowacourts.gov/iowa-courts/supreme-court/supreme-court-opinions/case/21-0831

Principal Historical Documents

• Journal of the Convention for the Formation of a Constitution for the State of Iowa (1845).

• Constitution of the State of Iowa, adopted in convention November 1, 1844.

• The Constitution of 1846, including its historical introduction.

• The Debates of the Constitutional Convention of the State of Iowa, Volumes I and II (1857).

• Constitution of the State of Iowa, adopted in convention March 5, 1857.

• Constitution of the State of Iowa, with an Analysis of the State Government (Des Moines, 1877).