Iowa's Broken Judiciary:
Branch Two: Wilson v. State of Iowa and Kim Reynolds for Iowa, Case. No. LACL15795
Part Two of Seven:
How Iowa's Attorney General's Office Strained Out a Gnat
How Iowa's obscure statutory step, contingent upon one of the most controversial cases in U.S. history, was used to violate my right to due process, and prevent the case from being evaluated on "weightier matters"
By Sondra Wilson | Updated August 1, 2026
An Arbitrary Administrative Requirement Buried within the Iowa Tort Claims Act
Was Used to Violate My Due Process Rights and Prevent Justice
I presented a written tort claim to the State of Iowa before filing this lawsuit.
The State Appeal Board accepted it, assigned it a claim number, referred it to the Attorney General’s Office for investigation, and told me:
“You will be notified in due time by the State Appeal Board on final disposition of your claim.”
No final disposition arrived before I filed suit.
The State later argued that this absence of a decision did not allow the case to proceed. Under the Iowa Tort Claims Act, I was required to send a separate written notice stating that I was “withdrawing” the unresolved claim before beginning the lawsuit.
I had not withdrawn it.
I still asserted that the claim was valid. I still sought redress for the injuries described within it. In ordinary language, withdrawing a claim would appear to mean abandoning it—not transferring it from an administrative process into court.
The State nevertheless argued that my failure to complete that additional step meant I had not exhausted administrative remedies. The district court accepted the State’s arguments, dismissed the action with prejudice, and later denied reconsideration without further hearing.
This installment reconstructs how that happened.
Executive Summary
In 2023, I prepared and submitted a tort claim against the State of Iowa concerning a series of injuries I alleged had been caused or enabled by state and local governmental actors.
The State Appeal Board received the claim on September 11, 2023, assigned it Claim No. T240135, and referred it to the Attorney General’s Office. Its September 27 letter stated that the Attorney General would investigate and report back and that I would be notified of the claim’s final disposition.
I received no final disposition before filing suit.
On February 8, 2024, immediately before leaving for DMACC’s London Abroad program, I filed Wilson v. State of Iowa and Kim Reynolds for Iowa, Polk County Case No. LACL157953. I filed when I did because I believed a limitations deadline was approaching and feared it might expire while I was overseas.
The State later argued that Iowa Code § 669.5 required more than submission of the administrative claim and the passage of six months. Because the Attorney General had not issued a final disposition, I was required to provide written notice withdrawing the claim before beginning suit.
The State acknowledged that I had completed the first step by submitting the tort claim. Its objection concerned the missing withdrawal notice.
I responded that the requirement should not be applied to permanently bar the action. The State had received the claim, had been able to investigate it, had promised notice of a final disposition, and had not issued one. I asked the court to recognize the claim as withdrawn, permit the remaining administrative step to be completed, allow the Attorney General to issue a disposition, or otherwise avoid dismissal with prejudice.
I also argued that the requirement itself was arbitrary and capricious. In ordinary usage, withdrawing a claim means relinquishing it or communicating that it is no longer asserted. Yet the Iowa Tort Claims Act required me to “withdraw” a claim I continued to maintain before I could bring that same claim into court.
The court did not separately analyze that argument. It stated that the State’s positions were properly supported and mine were not supported by contrary controlling precedent. It dismissed the action with prejudice.
I moved for reconsideration and expressly challenged the withdrawal requirement as arbitrary and capricious. At minimum, I asked that dismissal be changed to one without prejudice so I could complete the missing step and refile.
The court denied reconsideration without further hearing or explanation.
The result was that the alleged injuries were not resolved through discovery, testimony, or factual adjudication. An unresolved administrative claim—and the absence of a document purporting to “withdraw” it—became one of the grounds preventing the case from reaching its underlying facts.
Table of Contents
I. The Administrative Tort Claim
July–September 2023 — I Prepared and Submitted a Claim Against the State
September 11 — The State Appeal Board Received the Claim
September 27 — The State Referred the Claim for Investigation and Promised a Final Disposition
The Letter Did Not Explain the Withdrawal Requirement
II. The Lawsuit and the Unresolved Claim
February 8, 2024 — I Filed Before Leaving for London
May 22 — The State First Raised the Failure to Withdraw
June 11 — The Administrative Claim Entered the Court Record
July 23 — I Explained Why the Claim Had Not Been Withdrawn
I Proposed Several Alternatives to Permanent Dismissal
III. The State's Exhaustion Argument
July 26 — The State Said I Had Completed the First Step but Not the Second
The State Characterized My Argument as a Request for Special Treatment
The State Asked the Court to Dismiss the Tort Claims as a Matter of Law
IV. My Response
August 5 — I Argued That the State’s Reading Defeated the Purpose of the Act
The State Had Notice; the Claim Was Already Under Review
The Omitted Step Could Still Be Completed
The “Spirit of the Law” Argument
The Withdrawal Requirement Created a Contradiction
V. The Court's Ruling
August 9 — The Court Heard Argument on the Motion to Dismiss
August 21 — The Court Accepted the State’s Arguments Collectively
The Court Did Not Address the Withdrawal Problem Separately
Dismissal With Prejudice Converted a Curable Step Into a Permanent Bar
VI. Reconsideration
September 7 — I Expressly Challenged the Requirement as Arbitrary and Capricious
What Does It Mean to “Withdraw” a Claim?
I Asked the Court to Allow Refiling Even If It Would Not Reinstate the Case
September 9 — Reconsideration Was Denied Without Further Hearing
VII. What the Procedure Prevented
The Court Never Determined Whether the Underlying Allegations Were True
The State’s Failure to Decide the Claim Became Part of the Barrier
A Procedural Transition Was Treated as Abandonment Language
The Record Preserved the Rule but Not the Remedy
I. The Administrative Tort Claim
July-September 2023 — I Prepared and Submitted a Claim Against the State
Notice of Claim Pursuant to the Iowa Tort Claims Act
Prepared and submitted in 2023; later filed in the court record as Attachment A.
In 2023, I prepared a written tort claim concerning injuries I alleged had been caused or enabled by governmental officials, agencies, and institutions.
The claim form identified the agencies or governmental bodies involved and described incidents occurring in 2006, 2009, 2019, 2022, and 2023. It sought $9,750,000 for personal injuries.
The accompanying narrative described several groups of alleged harms, including:
- alleged misconduct by local officials in Ames;
- injuries connected to criminal proceedings from 2006 and 2009;
- state actions concerning Medicaid coverage for medically necessary gender-affirming care;
- statements and governmental conduct affecting transgender Iowans;
- the Iowa Civil Rights Commission’s handling of my administrative complaint;
- emotional injuries, anxiety, PTSD, reputational harm, and years of homelessness.
The administrative claim was therefore not a placeholder or a one-page notice lacking substance. It contained a lengthy factual narrative and supporting materials describing the injuries for which I sought redress.
My later amended petition referred to July 6, 2023, as the date I filed the tort claim. The official State Appeal Board record, however, identifies September 11, 2023, as the date the claim was received.
The most accurate public description is therefore:
I began preparing and pursuing the administrative tort claim during the summer of 2023. The completed claim materials were signed and processed in September, and the State Appeal Board officially recorded receipt on September 11, 2023.
That distinction avoids erasing either part of the record.
September 11 — The State Appeal Board Received the Claim
State Appeal Board Claim Form and Affidavit
Claim No. T240135.
The State Appeal Board stamped and processed the claim under Claim No. T240135.
The form classified it as a tort claim against the State and listed $9,750,000 in claimed personal-injury damages.
The form also left the attorney-information section blank. I was proceeding without counsel.
The record therefore establishes that the State received a formal administrative claim before the district-court action began.
September 27 — The State Referred the Claim for Investigation and Promised a Final Disposition
State Appeal Board Acknowledgement Letter
Issued September 27, 2023; Claim No. T240135.
On September 27, the State Appeal Board wrote:
“Your claim against the State of Iowa in the amount of $9,750,000.00 was received by the State Appeal Board on 9/11/2023.”
The letter continued:
“By copy of this letter, your claim is being referred to the Attorney General’s Office who will investigate your claim and report back to the State Appeal Board.”
It instructed me to answer questions if further information was requested and provided contact information for the Attorney General’s tort-claims office.
It ended with:
“You will be notified in due time by the State Appeal Board on final disposition of your claim.”
The letter therefore communicated three things:
1. The claim had been received;
2. The Attorney General’s Office would investigate it; and
3. The State Appeal Board would notify me of its final disposition.
I reasonably understood that the process was underway and that the State would contact me when it reached a decision.
The Letter Did Not Mention a "Withdrawal" Requirement
The September 27 letter did not explain that, if the Attorney General failed to issue a final disposition within six months, I would need to send a separate written notice “withdrawing” the claim before filing suit.
It did not state:
- that silence after six months would not itself exhaust the process;
- that I would remain barred from filing until I affirmatively withdrew the claim;
- that the withdrawal had to be in writing;
- where such a notice should be sent;
- what language it should contain;
- or that filing suit without first sending it could result in dismissal.
Instead, the letter told me that I would be notified of the final disposition.
I Called for an Updated but Received No Response
After receiving no final disposition, I called the State and left a message concerning the status of my claim. I do not have a surviving telephone record and cannot now identify the exact date of that call. In my July 23 amended petition, however, I stated that I called approximately one or two months after the September 27 acknowledgement letter. In my August 5 resistance, I again informed the court that I had called and left a message but, to my knowledge, never received a return call.
The State had expressly told me:
“You will be notified in due time by the State Appeal Board on final disposition of your claim.”
No such disposition arrived before I filed suit.
II. The Lawsuit and the Unresolved Claim
February 8, 2024 — I Filed Before Leaving for London
Original Petition
Filed February 8, 2024; D0001.
I filed the lawsuit on February 8, one day before leaving Iowa to participate in DMACC’s London Abroad program.
I was attempting to preserve claims I believed were approaching a limitations deadline. At the time, I was not a lawyer. I was a full-time student attempting to research civil procedure, prepare for international travel, complete coursework, apply for scholarships, and preserve claims involving events extending across many years.
The administrative claim remained unresolved.
I had not received the final disposition the State Appeal Board said would be provided.
I also had not sent a written notice withdrawing the claim.
That omission later became one of the State’s principal grounds for dismissal.
I filed this action on February 8, one day before leaving Iowa for DMACC’s London Abroad program.
The timing was not based simply upon dissatisfaction with how long the State was taking to investigate the tort claim. I believed another limitations period arising from evidence I had discovered in November 2022 was approaching, and I feared that waiting until I returned from Europe would be too late.
May 22 — The State First Raised the Failure to Withdraw
Defendant State of Iowa’s Motion to Dismiss
Filed May 22, 2024.
After being served, the State argued that the Iowa Tort Claims Act required exhaustion of the administrative process before suit could begin.
The State cited Iowa Code § 669.5 and explained that if the Attorney General did not issue a final disposition within six months, a claimant could provide written notice withdrawing the claim and then begin suit.
The State’s position was not that I had never filed an administrative claim.
The objection was that I had filed suit while the administrative claim technically remained pending.
June 11 — The Administrative Claim Entered the Court Record
Plaintiff’s Filing of Tort Claim and State Appeal Board Response
Filed June 11, 2024; supporting materials attached to the record.
The State Appeal Board’s September 27 letter, the claim form, and the substantive claim narrative were filed in the district-court record.
Those materials established that:
- a written claim existed;
- the State had received it;
- the State had assigned it a number;
- the claim had been referred to the Attorney General;
- the State had an opportunity to investigate;
- and the Board had promised notice of a final disposition.
The exhaustion dispute therefore did not arise from a complete failure to invoke the administrative process.
It arose from how the process was supposed to end.
July 23 — I Explained Why the Claim Had Not Been Withdrawn
Plaintiff’s Amended Petition With Minor Corrections and Additional Remedies Requested
Filed July 23, 2024; D0030.
In the amended petition, I addressed the State’s exhaustion argument directly.
I quoted the September 27 letter and explained that I had not heard from the Attorney General’s Office concerning the claim.
I stated that I filed the lawsuit before leaving for London because I feared the limitations period might expire while I was overseas.
I acknowledged that I had not known of the separate withdrawal requirement:
“I was not notified of the requirement to withdraw the claim prior to filing this suit.”
I further explained:
“I did my best and filed in good faith to the best of my ability whilst adhering to the ITCA and Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure, however must have missed this step whilst attempting to faithfully navigate an extremely complex system I have been studying for years, as time has allowed me.”
This was an acknowledgement of the procedural omission—not an abandonment of the underlying claim.
I Proposed Several Alternatives to Permanent Dismissal
The amended petition did not ask the court merely to ignore Iowa Code § 669.5.
I attempted to propose practical alternatives.
I explained that the Attorney General’s Office could disclose whether it had reached a final disposition.
Depending on the answer:
- if the State had reached a disposition, it could provide it;
- if no disposition existed, the claim could be treated as withdrawn so the lawsuit could proceed;
- if the State concluded the claim had merit, the parties could explore resolution;
- if the State denied it, the litigation could resume;
- or the court could pause the case long enough to complete the missing step.
The central request was proportionality.
The omission concerned a procedural transition from administrative review into litigation. It did not erase the claim, remove the State’s notice, or prevent the State from investigating.
I asked that the omission be cured rather than converted into permanent forfeiture.
III. The State's "Exhaustion" Argument
July 26 — The State Said I Had Completed the First Step but Not the Second
Defendant State of Iowa’s Motion to Dismiss Amended Petition
Filed July 26, 2024; D0031.
The State described the Iowa Tort Claims Act as establishing a two-step process.
First, a person must submit a claim for administrative consideration.
Second, if the process does not resolve the claim, the person may proceed into district court after complying with § 669.5.
The State expressly acknowledged that I completed the first step:
“Here, Plaintiff satisfied the first step by filing a tort claim with the Department of Management on September 11, 2023.”
It then identified the defect:
“But, critically, to date, the Attorney General has yet to make a final disposition of Plaintiff’s claim, nor has Plaintiff withdrawn her claim from administrative review.”
The State argued that a claimant is not permitted to file suit while administrative review remains pending and cited Rivera v. Woodward Resource Center, Bensley v. State, and Anderson v. State.
It concluded:
“As such, Plaintiff has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies, and her tort claims against the State must be dismissed as a matter of law.”
The State Mischaracterized My Argument as a Request for Special Treatment
The State described my position as follows:
“Instead, Plaintiff argues that she should be excused for this procedural misstep solely because she is a pro se plaintiff.”
It then relied on cases stating that self-represented litigants must follow the same procedural rules as attorneys.
The State quoted:
“The law does not judge by two standards, one for lawyers and another for lay persons.”
It also quoted:
“If lay persons choose to proceed pro se, they do so at their own risk.”
That framing reduced my response to a claim that nonlawyers should be exempt from legal requirements.
But my argument was broader.
I did explain the practical circumstances under which I missed the requirement. I also argued that:
- the State had received the claim;
- the State had left it unresolved;
- its acknowledgement letter promised a final disposition;
- the purpose of exhaustion had substantially been fulfilled;
- the missing step remained curable;
- permanent dismissal would defeat the remedial purpose of the Act;
- and the withdrawal requirement itself was conceptually arbitrary.
Those arguments were not answered merely by observing that self-represented parties must follow procedural rules.
The State Asked the Court to Dismiss the Tort Claims as a Matter of Law
The State did not ask that the lawsuit be paused while the remaining administrative step was completed.
It did not suggest allowing me to send a withdrawal notice and amend the petition.
It did not ask for dismissal without prejudice limited to the tort claims.
Instead, it argued that the court lacked authority to hear those claims because exhaustion had not been completed before filing.
The procedural question therefore became outcome-determinative before any factual record concerning the alleged injuries was developed.
IV. My Response
August 5 — I Argued That the State's Reading Defeated the Purpose of the Act
Plaintiff’s Resistance, Motions to Amend, Notice of Constitutional Question, and Related Requests
Filed August 5, 2024; D0032.
I responded that the State’s interpretation elevated one procedural step over the purpose of the Iowa Tort Claims Act.
I wrote:
“The purpose of the ITCA is to provide Citizens with an avenue for redress. The purpose is not to deny Citizens redress due to inadvertently missing a nuanced step within an overly-complex system.”
I argued that the State was using the letter of the law to produce an unjust result.
I did not deny that § 669.5 contained the withdrawal language.
I disputed what should follow from missing that step when:
- the claim had already been filed;
- more than six months had passed;
- the State had not decided it;
- and the defect could still be cured.
The State Had Notice; the Claim Was Already Under Review
The usual purposes of administrative exhaustion include giving the government notice, allowing investigation, permitting administrative resolution, and potentially avoiding unnecessary litigation.
The record showed that the State had already received the claim and referred it to the Attorney General.
The administrative process was not bypassed.
It had begun and then remained unresolved.
The procedural dispute concerned whether I had used the proper mechanism to end that process before filing suit.
That distinction mattered because the State had not been deprived of the opportunity the administrative procedure was designed to provide.
The Omitted Step Could Still Be Completed
I reiterated the alternatives proposed in the amended petition.
I asked the court to allow the Attorney General to state whether a final disposition existed.
I proposed that the claim be deemed withdrawn if no disposition had been issued.
I also suggested completing the administrative step before the lawsuit resumed.
The omission did not require evidence to be reconstructed, a deadline to be recreated, or prejudice to the State to be undone.
It required written notice.
That made dismissal with prejudice especially severe.
The "Spirit of the Law" Argument
I relied on the principle that courts should avoid applying statutory language in a manner that creates absurdity, injustice, contradiction, or defeat of the statute’s purpose.
I wrote:
“The State made no mention of the effect of the spirit of the law doctrine, referenced in D0030 ¶ 8, versus the ‘letter of the law,’ which the State seeks to persuade the Court into using in order to deny me redress in a manner which would create both absurdity and injustice.”
I continued:
“To dismiss this suit in its entirety based upon the letter of the law would cause further harm to me, and would create both absurdity and injustice.”
I described the withdrawal requirement, under the circumstances, as:
“a perfect example of the over-complexity of Iowa’s legal system which makes redress inaccessible to Iowa’s Citizenry.”
The argument was not that courts may erase every procedural statute perceived as harsh.
It was that an exhaustion statute intended to create an orderly path to redress should not be applied to permanently destroy a claim where its administrative purpose had substantially been served and the remaining omission was curable.
The Withdrawal Requirement Created a Contradiction
At this stage, my briefing focused primarily on complexity, purpose, absurdity, and the possibility of curing the omitted step.
The more direct linguistic challenge appeared later in the motion to reconsider.
But the underlying contradiction was already present:
The law required me to continue asserting the tort claim in court only after first stating that I was “withdrawing” it from the State’s administrative process.
Legally, the term referred to withdrawing the claim from administrative consideration.
In ordinary language, however, withdrawing a claim can mean relinquishing or abandoning it.
That difference between technical meaning and ordinary meaning became central to my later challenge.
V. The Court's Ruling
August 9 — The Court Heard Argument on the Motion to Dismiss
Contested Hearing on the State’s Motion to Dismiss
Held August 9, 2024.
The district court heard argument concerning the State’s motion.
The court later stated that it had considered the arguments made at the hearing, reviewed the file, and applied Iowa’s motion-to-dismiss standard.
No discovery had occurred concerning the broader factual allegations.
No witnesses testified concerning the underlying alleged injuries.
The hearing concerned whether the claims could legally proceed.
August 21 — The Court Accepted the State's Arguments Collectively
Ruling on Defendant State of Iowa’s Motion to Dismiss Amended Petition
Entered August 21, 2024; D0042.
The court listed the State’s exhaustion position among the grounds supporting dismissal:
“The plaintiff has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies under the Iowa Tort Claims Act.”
The ruling summarized my response as including:
“her failure to exhaust her administrative remedies should be excused because of the ‘spirit of the law’ doctrine.”
The court then stated:
“Plaintiff does not reply to the defendant’s arguments with any of her own supported by contrary controlling precedent.”
It continued:
“It would unnecessarily lengthen this ruling by addressing each one of the defendant’s positions as expressed in its motion point by point.”
The court concluded:
“It is sufficient to say that all of the defendant’s arguments are properly supported by appropriate legal authority and none of the plaintiff’s arguments are.”
It dismissed the action with prejudice.
The Court Did not Address the Withdrawal Problem Separately
The ruling did not separately examine:
- the State Appeal Board’s promise of a final disposition;
- the absence of such a disposition;
- whether the purposes of administrative exhaustion had already been served;
- whether the missing notice could be completed after filing;
- whether the action could be stayed;
- whether amendment could cure the defect;
- whether the tort claims should be dismissed without prejudice;
- or whether permanent dismissal produced an unjust or self-defeating result.
It also did not analyze the ordinary meaning of “withdraw,” because my most explicit formulation of that argument appeared in the later reconsideration filing.
The exhaustion question was accepted as one item within the State’s larger collection of dismissal arguments.
Dismissal "With Prejudice" Unjustly Converted a Curable Step Into a Permanent Bar
A dismissal without prejudice ordinarily leaves open the possibility of completing the missing requirement and filing again, subject to limitations and other defenses.
A dismissal with prejudice purports to end the claim permanently.
That distinction transformed the withdrawal issue.
Had the court paused the case or dismissed without prejudice, I could potentially have:
1. Sent written notice withdrawing the claim from administrative consideration;
2. Documented exhaustion;
3. And attempted to refile.
By dismissing with prejudice, the court treated the procedural defect as grounds not merely to delay the case, but to prevent another action on the same claims.
The practical result was that the missing withdrawal notice could no longer simply be supplied.
VI. Reconsideration
September 7 — I Expressly Challenged the Requirement as Arbitrary and Capricious
Plaintiff’s Request to Submit Amended Motion to Reconsider With Revisions Indicated in Red
Filed September 7, 2024; D0047.
In the motion to reconsider, I returned to the exhaustion issue and presented the linguistic and constitutional objection more directly.
The section heading stated:
“The state’s requirement for Citizens to withdraw their claims prior to filing suit is both arbitrary and capricious, and ought to be struck down as unconstitutional.”
I then wrote:
“The state’s requirement to withdraw one’s claim prior to filing suit is both arbitrary and capricious.”
This is the argument you remembered.
It was not merely that the rule was difficult to locate.
I argued that the required act appeared conceptually inconsistent with continuing to assert the claim.
What Does it Mean to "Withdraw" a Claim?
I explained:
“The only reason to withdraw a claim is to indicate to the claimee that one no longer holds the claim and therefore nothing is owed.”
I then offered examples:
“When filing against a private party, one does not file a claim and then withdraw it prior to filing suit, as doing so would indicate that nothing is then owed.”
I also argued that certain federal administrative systems treat withdrawal as though the claim had never been filed.
I continued:
“In general, a claim remains filed and in force throughout the duration of lawsuits, and is never withdrawn unless to indicate to the claimee that the claimant no longer wishes to pursue the claim, or that the claim is not owed.”
The argument was therefore based on the ordinary communicative meaning of the required act.
I was not abandoning the claim.
I maintained that the State owed redress.
Yet the statute required a document called a withdrawal before I could place that same claim before a court.
The Statute Used One Word for Two Different Things
The legal meaning of § 669.5 is narrower than complete abandonment.
The claimant withdraws the claim from administrative consideration so that the same dispute may proceed in district court.
But that limiting phrase does not eliminate the public-facing contradiction.
In ordinary usage:
“I withdraw my claim”
sounds like:
“I no longer assert that this claim is valid.”
The statute instead uses withdrawal to mean:
“I continue to assert this claim, but I am removing it from this administrative forum so I may pursue it in a judicial forum.”
Your challenge was that Iowa placed the burden on claimants to know that specialized meaning and then treated failure to invoke it correctly as a basis for barring suit.
That is the clearest way to explain the argument publicly without overstating the statute’s legal effect.
I Argued That the State Could Simply Issue a Disposition
I wrote:
“The state could easily provide a final disposition without arbitrarily requiring Citizens to withdraw a perfectly valid claim.”
I continued:
“Withdrawing a claim is not standard practice in general.”
I then argued that the requirement appeared capable of functioning as a trap:
“It appears that, in this case, this strange requirement is used to trip up plaintiffs in order to provide the state an excuse to shirk liability.”
And:
“I would be greatly surprised if other Iowans have not been unfairly barred from having their cases moved forward due this arbitrary and capricious ‘requirement’ which appears prima facie as a form of trickery.”
That language was forceful, but the structural point underneath it was concrete:
- the State controls the administrative process;
- the State may leave the claim unresolved;
- the claimant must wait at least six months;
- the claimant must then discover that silence is not enough;
- the claimant must affirmatively withdraw the unresolved claim;
- and failure to perform that transition correctly may prevent judicial review.
I Asked the Court to Allow Refiling Even if it Would Not Reinstate the Case
The motion asked the court to reverse the August 21 ruling.
But I also made a narrower alternative request:
“If the court is unwillingly to change the ruling for whatever reason, I request the court to change the ‘with prejudice’ determination to ‘without prejudice’ in order to give me an opportunity to refile in the future.”
I specifically asked the court to strike down:
“the arbitrary and capricious requirement for claimants to withdraw their claims prior to filing suit.”
Even if the court rejected that constitutional challenge, the request to change the dismissal to one without prejudice would have preserved the possibility of completing the requirement and returning to court.
September 9 — Reconsideration Was Denied Without Further Hearing
Order Denying Reconsideration
Entered September 9, 2024; D0048.
The court issued a brief order stating:
“Plaintiff’s motion and supplemental motion to reconsider filed pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904(2), as well as the motion to consider having the prior dismissal be with prejudice, are all denied without further hearing.”
The wording appears to contain an error.
I had not asked the court to make the dismissal with prejudice. I asked it to reverse that determination or change the dismissal to without prejudice.
The order did not address:
- the arbitrary-and-capricious challenge;
- the ordinary meaning of withdrawal;
- whether the defect could be cured;
- whether the State had ever issued a final disposition;
- the request to permit refiling;
- or the apparent contradiction between continuing to assert a claim and being required to “withdraw” it.
Reconsideration was simply denied.
VII. What the Procedure Prevented
The Court Never Determined Whether the Underlying Allegations Were True
The dismissal did not follow a trial on the alleged injuries.
It did not follow discovery into the government records, communications, administrative decisions, or conduct described in the claim.
It did not follow testimony from the officials, employees, attorneys, investigators, witnesses, or other people involved.
The court decided that the claims could not proceed as pleaded and under the legal authorities presented.
The underlying factual controversy was therefore never fully adjudicated.
The State's Failure to Decide the Claim Became Part of the Barrier
The State Appeal Board told me that I would be notified of the final disposition.
No such disposition arrived before I filed suit.
That absence did not automatically open the courthouse door.
Instead, it created the condition under which I was required to discover and invoke the statutory withdrawal procedure.
The sequence was therefore:
1. I filed a claim.
2. The State accepted it.
3. The State referred it for investigation.
4. The State promised notice of a final disposition.
5. The State did not issue one before suit.
6. I filed after waiting, but without withdrawing the claim.
7. The State argued that the unresolved claim remained pending.
8. The court dismissed the case.
The State’s failure to resolve the claim was not treated as exhaustion.
It was treated as a process that remained open until I formally ended it.
A Procedural Transition Was Treated as Abandonment Language
Legally, withdrawal under § 669.5 means withdrawing the claim from administrative consideration.
Publicly and linguistically, however, the requirement is counterintuitive.
A citizen who continues to assert:
“The State harmed me, and this claim remains valid”
must first send a document effectively stating:
“I withdraw the claim from administrative consideration”
before presenting it to the judiciary.
The distinction is intelligible to attorneys familiar with administrative exhaustion.
It is far less obvious to an unrepresented claimant reading a letter that promises a future final disposition but does not explain the withdrawal procedure.
That gap between technical and ordinary meaning was central to my reconsideration argument.
The Record Preserved the Rule but Not the Remedy
The Iowa Tort Claims Act is presented as a limited waiver of sovereign immunity—a means by which injured people may seek recovery from the State.
In this case, however, the Act’s procedure operated as a barrier.
I had submitted the claim.
The State had received it.
The State had the opportunity to investigate it.
The administrative process had remained unresolved for months.
The missing act was a notice withdrawing that claim from consideration before filing suit.
I argued that the requirement should not permanently eliminate the remedy the statute purported to provide. I asked to cure the defect, obtain a disposition, deem the claim withdrawn, pause the litigation, or at minimum preserve the ability to refile.
None of those alternatives was granted.
The claim remained unresolved administratively.
The lawsuit was dismissed judicially.
The dismissal was entered with prejudice.
And the alleged injuries were never reached on their underlying facts.
That is how the requirement to “withdraw” a claim I continued to assert became one of the procedural grounds that ended Wilson v. State of Iowa and Kim Reynolds for Iowa, Polk County Case No. LACL157953.
VIII. Why This Result Deserves Renewed Judicial Review
This Was a Curable Error —not an Adjudication of the Alleged Injustices
I do not deny that Iowa Code § 669.5 contained a procedural requirement I failed to complete before filing suit.
The State Appeal Board had received my claim. The Attorney General had not issued a final disposition. Under the statute, I was required to provide written notice withdrawing the claim from administrative consideration before beginning the court action.
I did not know that.
But acknowledging the procedural error does not answer the more important question:
Did that one curable omission justify permanently extinguishing the claims before the underlying facts were meaningfully examined?
The administrative process had not been bypassed.
I had filed a detailed claim. The State accepted it, numbered it, referred it to the Attorney General’s Office, and had the opportunity to investigate. The State Appeal Board told me that I would be notified “in due time” of the final disposition. After receiving no decision, I called and left a message seeking information about the claim. To my knowledge, the call was not returned.
The missing act was not presentation of the claim.
It was not notice to the State.
It was not identification of the alleged injuries.
It was not refusal to participate in administrative review.
It was a written notice formally transferring an already-presented, still-valid claim from administrative consideration into court.
That mistake could have been corrected.
I asked the court to permit precisely that.
The State's Own Letter Omitted the Step Later Used Against Me
The State Appeal Board’s September 27 letter was not merely silent about an incidental detail.
It affirmatively told me:
“You will be notified in due time by the State Appeal Board on final disposition of your claim.”
A person receiving that instruction could reasonably believe that the next required event would come from the State.
The letter did not explain that:
- the State might issue no decision;
- silence would not automatically complete exhaustion;
- after six months, the claimant must send a separate written withdrawal;
- “withdrawal” means removal from administrative consideration rather than abandonment of the claim;
- and filing without that notice could prevent the court from hearing the case.
The State knew that the claim had been filed without an attorney. The attorney-information portion of the claim form was blank. Yet the acknowledgement letter did not identify the very procedural mechanism governing when and how an unrepresented claimant could proceed to court.
The law may place constructive notice of statutes upon everyone. But a government institution administering a remedial process should not design its correspondence as though every claimant has the time, training, health, and resources to search the Iowa Code for a hidden transition requirement—especially after the government has expressly promised that it will provide notice of the claim’s disposition.
At minimum, the acknowledgement letter could have included one paragraph:
If the Attorney General does not make a final disposition within six months, Iowa Code § 669.5 permits you to provide written notice withdrawing the claim from administrative consideration and then begin suit. Filing suit before final disposition or written withdrawal may result in dismissal.
That warning would have cost the State virtually nothing.
Its absence ultimately cost me the opportunity to have the alleged injuries examined.
The Requirement Is Especially Dangerous for People Without Counsel
This problem extends beyond my case.
The Iowa Tort Claims Act applies to ordinary people harmed by governmental conduct. Those people may include:
- parents working multiple jobs;
- people caring for children or elderly relatives;
- people with physical, cognitive, or psychiatric disabilities;
- people without reliable internet access;
- people with limited education;
- people facing housing instability;
- people who cannot afford counsel;
- and people already overwhelmed by the injury that forced them to seek redress.
The legal system may formally presume that every claimant has read and understood every applicable statute. Human beings do not live under formal presumptions.
A working parent may have only a few hours each week to prepare a claim. A person with a disability may struggle with sustained reading, concentration, or executive functioning. A traumatized person may be required to recount the very events that impaired their ability to navigate the process. A claimant may be simultaneously confronting medical bills, employment loss, family responsibilities, or an approaching limitations deadline.
For those people, the difference between:
“The State will notify you of its final decision”
and:
“If the State remains silent, you must discover and invoke a separate statutory withdrawal mechanism”
is not trivial.
It can determine whether the courthouse door opens at all.
A remedial statute should not operate as a comprehension test that silently filters out people unable to recognize specialized procedural language.
Two Limitations Problems Forced Me Into Simultaneous Litigation
My own circumstances illustrate why the omission mattered.
I was not handling one uncomplicated claim in isolation.
By late 2023 and early 2024, I was attempting to preserve two substantial and factually overlapping cases arising under different procedures and limitations periods.
In the Reliable Street case, the Iowa Civil Rights Commission had withheld the full administrative file until after I requested a right-to-sue letter. That request started a ninety-day filing period. I received the complete file on October 11, 2023, and filed that civil action on December 5—fifty-five days later.
At the same time, I was attempting to preserve claims arising from records I obtained in November 2022. Those records revealed matters I alleged had not previously been disclosed to me, including my attorney’s entry of pleas I disputed authorizing and Judge Steven Van Marel’s prior involvement and recusal in an earlier case. My petition asserted that the discovery rule and equitable tolling caused limitations periods connected to those allegations to begin when I obtained the records.
I first pursued the administrative paths I understood to be available. I filed complaints with the Judicial Qualifications Commission and the Attorney Disciplinary Board. I then presented the tort claim to the State.
But the State Appeal Board did not issue a final disposition before I was scheduled to leave Iowa for DMACC’s London Abroad program on February 9, 2024.
From what I understood at the time, waiting until I returned risked losing claims to the limitations period I believed had begun with my November 2022 discovery. I therefore filed the State case on February 8, immediately before leaving the country.
My legal understanding of the precise limitations statutes may not have been correct in every respect. But the pressure was real.
I was attempting to avoid one perceived procedural bar while unknowingly crossing another.
Equal Procedural Standards Do Not Create Equal Access
The State responded that self-represented litigants are held to the same procedural standards as attorneys.
That proposition does not resolve the problem.
Applying the same rule to everyone is not the same as ensuring that everyone has a meaningful opportunity to comply.
An attorney handling an Iowa Tort Claims Act matter would likely know—or know how to locate—the distinction between presenting a claim, waiting six months, withdrawing it from administrative consideration, and commencing suit.
An unrepresented claimant may receive a letter saying only that the State will investigate and provide a final disposition.
Treating both people as though they possess the same training does not make the process equal. It makes the consequences equal while leaving the ability to avoid those consequences profoundly unequal.
The question is not whether courts should invent a separate body of law for self-represented litigants.
The question is whether the government should clearly disclose a mandatory and potentially case-ending step in the very acknowledgement letter it sends to people entering the process.
Nothing in equal application of the law required the State to conceal that information through silence.
Nothing prevented the State from using plain language.
Nothing prevented the court from allowing the omitted notice to be supplied.
Exhaustion Should Regulate Timing—Not Erase the Underlying Injury
Administrative exhaustion ordinarily serves identifiable purposes.
It gives the government notice. It permits investigation. It allows the agency to resolve a claim before litigation. It creates an administrative record. It may conserve judicial resources.
Those purposes had substantially been served here.
The State had the claim.
It knew the amount requested.
It knew the agencies, officials, events, and injuries alleged.
It referred the matter to the Attorney General for investigation.
The State’s later objection was that the administrative matter had not been formally terminated before the judicial matter began.
That is a timing and forum-transition problem.
It is not a factual determination that the alleged torts did not occur.
It is not a finding that the State suffered evidentiary prejudice.
It is not a finding that the claim was fraudulent or filed in bad faith.
It is not an adjudication that no injury existed.
Iowa cases demonstrate that nonexhaustion can be treated as a defect requiring dismissal without prejudice, rather than as a permanent adjudication on the merits. In Wagner v. State, the federal district court dismissed the plaintiff’s common-law claims without prejudice because the Iowa Tort Claims Act process had not been exhausted. The Iowa Supreme Court’s decision repeatedly described those claims as dismissed without prejudice, leaving open the possibility of compliance and later litigation.
That does not establish that every claim in my case necessarily had to survive every other defense.
It does demonstrate that failure to exhaust is capable of being treated for what it is: a problem of procedural readiness, not an adjudication of factual innocence or liability.
I Asked to Cure the Defect
Once the State identified the issue, I did not insist that the court pretend the statute did not exist.
I proposed alternatives.
I asked whether the Attorney General had made a final disposition.
I proposed that, if no disposition existed, the claim be treated as withdrawn.
I proposed allowing the administrative process to conclude.
I asked that litigation resume after the missing requirement was completed.
And when the court dismissed the case with prejudice, I asked at minimum that the judgment be changed to without prejudice, so that I could fulfill the requirement and attempt to refile.
The court denied that request without further hearing.
This matters because the severity of a procedural sanction should bear some relationship to the defect and to any prejudice caused.
Here, the missing act was a written notice.
The State already had the claim.
The defect could be identified in a sentence and corrected with a short filing.
Yet the consequence was permanent dismissal.
The Gnat Was the Missing Notice; the Camel Was the Case
Jesus condemned legal authorities who meticulously observed minor requirements while neglecting “the weightier matters of the law”—justice, mercy, and faithfulness.
He called them blind guides who would:
“strain out a gnat and swallow a camel.”
The withdrawal notice was the gnat.
The camel was everything the procedural ruling prevented the court from examining:
- allegations that an attorney changed pleas without my informed authorization;
- allegations that a judge failed to disqualify himself after prior personal involvement;
- the resulting criminal record;
- the warning from an officer that contributed to my leaving Iowa;
- years of homelessness and violence;
- state actions affecting access to medically necessary healthcare;
- the handling of my civil-rights complaint;
- the alleged reputational and psychological injuries;
- and the institutional reforms requested to prevent similar harm to others.
Even a cursory review of the petition showed that the case alleged severe and lasting injuries. The pleading may have been imperfect. Some theories may have been legally unavailable. Some defendants may have possessed immunities. Some factual allegations may ultimately have been disputed or disproved.
But none of that makes the underlying matters trivial.
A just process would distinguish between claims that fail after meaningful legal and factual examination and claims that never receive that examination because the claimant missed an obscure, curable transition step.
Here, the system scrutinized the missing withdrawal notice more closely than it scrutinized the alleged conduct for which the notice existed.
It strained out the gnat.
Then it swallowed the case.
The Injustice Was Not Enforcement of the Rule Alone
The injustice was not simply that the statute contained a withdrawal requirement.
The injustice arose from the combined operation of several events:
- The State told me it would provide a final disposition.
- The State did not explain the withdrawal procedure.
- No final disposition arrived.
- My follow-up call produced no response to my knowledge.
- Conflicting limitations pressures caused me to file before leaving the country.
- The State invoked the undisclosed requirement after suit began.
- I asked to cure the defect.
- The court declined to allow a cure.
- I asked at minimum for dismissal without prejudice.
- The court instead left the dismissal with prejudice in place.
- The underlying facts were never meaningfully adjudicated.
Any one of those events considered alone might appear procedural.
Together they produced substantive injustice.
The process did not merely regulate how I presented my claims.
It ensured that the claims could never be heard.
Why the Judgment Should Be Revisited
I do not ask that every allegation in my petition be accepted as true merely because I experienced procedural hardship.
I ask for something more fundamental:
a meaningful opportunity for the legally viable claims to be evaluated under the correct standards, through a developed record, rather than permanently foreclosed because I failed to submit one written notice ending an administrative process the State had itself left unresolved.
Reconsideration would not predetermine liability.
It would not remove every immunity or defense.
It would not excuse defective claims that cannot be corrected.
It would restore the distinction between a curable procedural mistake and an adjudication on the merits.
At minimum, the exhaustion-based dismissal should not have operated with prejudice. The State had notice, suffered no apparent loss of its opportunity to investigate, and identified a defect capable of immediate correction. Comparable ITCA nonexhaustion claims have been dismissed without prejudice so that the administrative process could be completed.
The public has an interest in orderly procedure.
But the public also has an interest in a judiciary that uses procedure to reach justice rather than to avoid it.
The Iowa Tort Claims Act should be a gateway into a lawful process—not a concealed tripwire that permanently closes it.
Where a citizen has filed the claim, supplied the allegations, waited for the promised decision, sought an update, faced competing deadlines, and asked to correct the missing step, justice is not served by elevating the form of withdrawal above the substance of the injuries.
The weightier matters remain.
They deserve to be heard.
A strong final pull quote
I would end the page with this set apart typographically:
The State had the claim. It had notice. It had the opportunity to investigate. The missing act was one written notice transferring the unresolved matter from an administrative forum into court. I asked to cure that omission. Instead, the court left a dismissal with prejudice in place and the alleged injustices were never reached. The system strained out the gnat—and swallowed the case.
Source Documents
State Appeal Board Tort Claim and Acknowledgement
Claim No. T240135; received September 11, 2023; acknowledgement issued September 27, 2023.
Plaintiff’s Amended Petition With Minor Corrections and Additional Remedies Requested
Filed July 23, 2024; D0030.
Defendant State of Iowa’s Motion to Dismiss Amended Petition
Filed July 26, 2024; D0031.
Plaintiff’s Resistance, Motions to Amend, Notice of Constitutional Question, and Related Requests
Filed August 5, 2024; D0032.
Ruling on Defendant State of Iowa’s Motion to Dismiss Amended Petition
Entered August 21, 2024; D0042.
Plaintiff’s Request to Submit Amended Motion to Reconsider With Revisions Indicated in Red
Filed September 7, 2024; D0047.
Order Denying Reconsideration
Entered September 9, 2024; D0048.