



This page describes Part Two of the court proceedings documented in [Iowa's Broken Judiciary](#) series. It covers May 16 through October 4, 2024.

Part Two documents a sudden reversal in Wilson v. Reliable Street Inc., et al.

Part One: Procedural Bombardment showed how defendants responded to my original two-page petition with coordinated challenges to service, venue, pleading form, and the sufficiency of every claim. They demanded substantially greater factual detail even though discovery had not begun and I had repeatedly explained that essential information remained within their control.

When the transferred case reached Story County, those disputes remained unresolved. Judge Bethany Currie announced that one hearing would address the pending matters and directed the parties to disclose whether they intended to present evidence so that sufficient time could be reserved.

Defendants declined to offer evidence. I informed the court that I intended to present at least thirty exhibits.

The court then stated that the substance of the pending matters would wait until after the hearing, where the parties could present whatever evidence they believed appropriate at that stage. It further explained that if thirty exhibits were

admitted and extensive testimony received, the hearing might need to occur in person so the evidence could be presented “in a commonsense fashion.”

Relying on those directions, I continued expanding the amended petition and organized approximately seventy sub-exhibits into seventeen—and later nineteen—folders. The record included communications, photographs, project documentation, civil-rights records, and materials bearing on the claims and the respective roles of the defendants.

I also repeatedly explained that other essential facts could not be known without discovery. Those included who created or altered disputed materials, who transmitted or approved them, what each defendant knew, whether their accounts were coordinated, how similarly situated non-transgender people had been treated, and whether the challenged conduct was motivated by discrimination or malice.

The evidentiary process was then withdrawn.

The combined hearing was limited to legal argument. On October 4, 2024, Judge Currie stated that the referenced exhibits would not be considered and dismissed every claim except one libel claim. Most were dismissed “with prejudice”—before discovery and before any jury could hear the factual disputes.

This installment reconstructs that sequence from the filings themselves. It examines how evidence was invited and then excluded, how unresolved facts controlled by defendants were treated as pleading deficiencies, why the stated plaintiff-favorable standard does not appear to have been meaningfully applied, and why the dismissed claims should be reopened.

Executive Summary

When Judge Bethany Currie inherited *Wilson v. Reliable Street Inc., et al.*, defendants’ motions to dismiss, recast, and require a more specific statement remained pending, together with my motions to amend, estop, and preserve the case for discovery.

I had repeatedly explained that essential facts—including authorship, knowledge, participation, coordination, comparator treatment, and malice—were either tied to evidence I had organized or controlled by defendants and unavailable without discovery.

Judge Currie directed the parties to disclose whether they intended to present evidence and later stated that the substance of the pending matters would wait until after a hearing at which the parties could present whatever evidence was

appropriate at that stage. Relying on those orders, I expanded the amended petition and organized approximately seventy sub-exhibits into seventeen, and later nineteen, folders.

The court later withdrew the evidentiary process, limited the combined hearing to legal argument, declined to consider the referenced exhibits, and dismissed every claim except one libel claim. Most were dismissed “with prejudice” before discovery.

The facts the court found missing fell into two categories: facts tied to an identified evidentiary record the court declined to receive, and facts controlled by defendants that were unavailable without discovery. Both categories were treated as pleading defects.

The result does not appear to reflect meaningful application of the stated plaintiff-favorable standard. Uncertainty involving defendants’ private conduct was repeatedly resolved against the claims, and dismissal “with prejudice” prevented later amendment and discovery from curing the asserted deficiencies.

Part Two documents how a court-created evidentiary process was withdrawn after reliance, how unavailable facts were used against a self-represented plaintiff, and how fact-dependent claims were permanently narrowed before the ordinary truth-seeking process could occur.

In This Part

1. Before Story County: Why Discovery Was Already Essential

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2. The Court Invited Evidence

The May 16 and May 28 orders directing the parties to disclose their evidentiary plans and indicating that substance would wait until after the combined hearing.

3. Documented Preparation, Not Delay

The continued drafting of the amended petition and organization of approximately seventy sub-exhibits into seventeen, and later nineteen, folders.

4. The Scope of the Combined Hearing Became Uncertain

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Promissory estoppel, the “volunteer” label, fraud, defamation, discrimination, constitutional equality, the jury right, and the consequences of dismissal “with prejudice.”

10. What the 2024 Dismissal Prevented From Developing

The later contractual, abuse-of-process, conspiracy, and coordinated-conduct allegations contained in the proposed Revised Second Amended Petition.

11. Next: Part Three — Plausible Deniability

The surviving libel claim, continuing efforts to obtain discovery, changing judicial assignments, and the increasingly complex record inherited by the next judge.

The record begins before Judge Currie inherited the case, because the necessity for discovery had already been explained repeatedly in the filings transferred from Polk County.

**March 15-April 1:
Before Judge Currie Inherited the Case,
I Had Already Explained Why Discovery Was Essential**

May 15 — Defendants Identified the Motions Still Awaiting Decision

Defendants' Notice of Pending Motions

Filed May 15, 2024; D0002.

After transfer, defendants notified the Story County court that their motion to dismiss, alternative motion to recast, and alternative motion for a more specific statement remained unresolved. My motions to amend, estop defendants from repeating statements I alleged were false, and preserve the case for discovery also remained unresolved.

These filings were covered in part within [Part One of this series](#).

Several excerpts that were not covered in Part One, but which had direct bearing on the necessity for discovery, were included in my pending filings:

Arguments Contained Within the Buried Record

“Certain claims I stated within my original petition ... may be more explicitly stated, except where Defendants appear to be attempting to usurp, undermine, and prevent the Discovery Process, and thus my Right to Due Process, from being exercised.”

March 15 omnibus filing, p. 2; D0001, p. 89.

“One of the primary purposes of this action is to substantiate the claims asserted; this will generally occur during the discovery process and trial. Thus far no government investigation and thorough review of evidence has occurred.”

March 15 omnibus filing, p. 5, ¶ 4; D0001, p. 92.

“I object to Defendants’ multiple requests to dismiss this action in its entirety, as they are attempts to deny me due process and disallow evidence and testimony to be presented....

Upon reviewing the evidence, it will become self-evident to the judge the exact reason Defendants have gone to such great length to try to prevent evidence from being examined. It would create a miscarriage of justice to dismiss this case during this early phase of the action.”

March 15 omnibus filing, pp. 16–17; D0001, pp. 103–104.

April 1 — I Explained That Defendants' Lack of Transparency Made It Impossible to Identify Every Party's Precise Role Before Discovery

I then explained that some defendants might not know what others had done and that depositions and interrogatories were needed:

"Some Defendants currently may not know who said what or to whom—and some may not know what exactly Defendants ... submitted to the Iowa Civil Rights Commission—or that statements submitted were in fact provably false."

April 1 motion, p. 3, ¶ 6; D0001, p. 22.

"It is important that interrogatories and depositions are entered by each of the Defendants prior to me divulging too much information, which could alter more honest statements which might otherwise be given."

April 1 motion, pp. 3–4, ¶ 6; D0001, pp. 22–23.

The defendants' conduct had made it impossible for me to know exactly who did what:

"Defendants have not been upfront and communicated directly with me ... which has made it impossible for me to determine the exact roles of each party."

April 1 motion, p. 8, ¶ 16; D0001, p. 27.

I objected to dismissal before the discovery and trial phases:

"Defendants' repeated attempts to get service quashed and the case dismissed ... appear to be designed to ... prevent this case from entering the discovery process and trial phases of the proceedings, at which point I will be able to prove the claims and allegations alleged within my Petition."

April 1 motion, p. 4, ¶ 8; D0001, p. 23.

This establishes the deeper contradiction: I was being challenged for insufficient factual detail while repeatedly explaining that the missing detail concerned facts held by the opposing parties.

May 15-28, 2024
The Court Invited Evidence and Indicated That
The Substance Would Wait Until After the Hearing

The following chain of filings were brief and straightforward. Therefore paragraph and page numbers are not necessary to be cited for this section.

May 16 — Judge Currie Announced One Hearing and Asked Whether Evidence Would Be Offered

Judge Currie's Order Offering Opportunity to Present Evidence at Forthcoming Hearing

Entered May 16, 2024; D0005.

"The Court will set one hearing to address the motions already pending as well as the additional matters that are filed before that date."

"The parties are requested to alert the Court how long they anticipate needing to address all pending motions..."

"[I]f the parties believe they will need additional time for argument - or if they intend to offer any evidence as well as argument - they are requested to alert the Court... so that sufficient time may be set aside."

The court therefore did not merely schedule legal argument. It expressly asked whether the parties intended to offer evidence and directed them to provide time estimates so that sufficient time could be reserved.

May 17 — Defendants Declined to Present Evidence

Defendants' Response to May 16 Order

Filed May 17, 2024; D0007.

Defendants chose to rely on dismissal arguments without presenting additional evidence.

"Defendants do not intend to offer any further evidence at the hearing."

May 24 — I Told the Court I Intended to Present at Least Thirty Exhibits

Plaintiff's Response to May 16 Order

Filed May 24, 2024; D0009.

I informed the court that I intended to offer at least 30 exhibits at the hearing, and that I would need at least an hour to do so.

"I intend to offer at least 30 pieces of evidence at the hearing..."

"I anticipate needing an hour to do this, however again I am new to this process and cannot provide a precise estimate at this time."

May 28 — The Court Reaffirmed That Evidence Could Be Presented Before the Pending Matters Were Decided

Judge Currie's Order Reaffirming the Presentation of Evidence Before Substantive Rulings

Entered May 28, 2024; D0013.

Judge Currie stated that the substance of the pending matters would wait until after the hearing, where the parties could "present whatever evidence they believe is appropriate to do so at this stage of the case" and make their legal arguments.

"[T]he substance will need to wait to be addressed following the hearing so the parties may present whatever evidence they believe is appropriate to do so at this stage of the case and may make their legal arguments...."

"If the parties anticipate that 30 exhibits will be admitted and extensive testimony will be needed at this hearing, the Court is inclined to hold the hearing in person to ensure that all parties have the exhibits in front of them and can present their evidence in a commonsense fashion."

The order indicated that the substance of the pending matters—including defendants' motion to dismiss—would wait until after the hearing. This followed the court's earlier direction that the parties identify whether they intended to offer evidence "so that sufficient time may be set aside."

After I informed the court that I intended to present at least thirty exhibits, the May 28 order reaffirmed that the parties could "present whatever evidence they believe is appropriate to do so at this stage of the case." It further stated that if thirty exhibits would be admitted and extensive testimony received, the court was inclined to hold the hearing in person so that the evidence could be presented "in a commonsense fashion."

Read together, these were not passing references to evidence. The court affirmatively directed the parties to disclose their evidentiary plans, explained that sufficient time would be reserved, delayed substantive consideration until after the hearing, and then described how a hearing involving numerous admitted exhibits and extensive testimony would be conducted.

The court's successive orders established a court-directed evidentiary process for the combined hearing by requiring the parties to disclose whether they intended to offer evidence so that sufficient time could be reserved, postponing substantive consideration until after the hearing, and describing how numerous exhibits and extensive testimony could be presented.

Those orders created a reasonable expectation—and a concrete basis for reliance—that evidence would be permitted before the pending matters were decided.

This was especially significant because the hearing was intended to address multiple unresolved matters, including defendants' motion to dismiss. As a self-represented litigant attempting to determine how those different motions would be handled together, I reasonably understood the court's successive orders to mean that evidence would be permitted at the combined hearing before the substance of the pending matters was decided.

The August 9 order later stated that a motion-to-dismiss hearing is not evidentiary, but it did not explain why the court had previously directed the parties to identify evidence so that time could be reserved, reaffirmed that evidence could be presented, and described a hearing involving thirty admitted exhibits and extensive testimony.

May 15-June 17, 2024

Contemporaneous Filings Documented Diligence and Progress

Between May 15 and June 7, I submitted repeated updates, partial drafts, and descriptions of the work completed. Those filings showed that the extension requests arose from the scale of defendants' procedural demands and the preparation of the amended petition and exhibits—not abandonment or inactivity.

May 15 — First Motion to Continue

Plaintiff's **Motion to Continue**

Filed May 15, 2024; D0006

I informed the court that I was actively drafting the amended petition and that defendants' numerous demands had made the work more extensive than expected:

"Because there were so many questions defendants put forth—and due to the large amount of schoolwork and recovery from jetlag—it is taking me longer than expected to draft the Amended Petition."

I stated that I expected to complete it the following week.

May 24 — Nearly Completed Draft Filed

Plaintiff's **Motion to Continue**

Filed May 24, 2024; D0010.

I attached the unfinished draft so the court could directly see the work completed:

"I have attached the Amended Petition, which is nearly complete, so the court may see that a lot of work has been done, and that the ending is unfinished."

May 28 — Further Progress Reported

Plaintiff's **Motion to Continue**

Filed May 28, 2024; D0012.

I informed the court that significant additional work had been completed and requested enough time to finish both the petition and organization of the supporting evidence:

“Significant progress has been made over the weekend with regard to finishing my Amended Petition.”

June 7 — Evidence Organized; Final Extension Requested

Plaintiff's Notice of Additional Time Needed and Motion to Continue

Filed June 7, 2024; D0015.

I reported:

“I also organized and labeled numerous pieces of evidence into a Google Doc folder to prepare it for the court.”

I attached the developing petition, stated that it was nearly complete, and requested only until the following week.

These contemporaneous filings demonstrated continuing, good-faith progress—not delay. They directly rebut defendants’ later characterization of the same period and show that the requested time was used to respond to defendants’ pleading demands and comply with the court’s express directions concerning the presentation of evidence.

The sequence culminated on June 17, when I filed the completed amended petition. That filing and the court’s later order entered the same day marked the transition from preparation of the record to uncertainty about how the combined hearing would proceed.

June 17–July 30, 2024
The Scope of the Combined Hearing
Became Uncertain,
but the Evidentiary Process Had Not Been Expressly
Withdrawn

June 17 — I Filed the Amended Petition; Later That Day, the Court Introduced Uncertainty About the Evidentiary Hearing

Plaintiff's Amended Petition

Filed June 17, 2024, at 9:41 a.m.; D0020.

Order Setting Hearing

Entered June 17, 2024, at 2:31 p.m.

After the documented sequence of extensions, I filed the amended petition on June 17. It responded to defendants' motions to dismiss, recast, and require a more specific statement and referred throughout to the organized exhibits supporting the allegations.

The petition expressly stated that it was submitted in response to defendants' procedural demands and Judge Currie's May orders. It further explained:

"This Amended Petition, in context with the evidence, will demonstrate to the court why it would create injustice to rule in favor of Defendants' Motions to Dismiss..."

The filing therefore informed the court that the amended allegations and the supporting evidentiary record were intended to operate together. It did not represent that every fact necessary to establish every defendant's knowledge, authorship, participation, or intent was already available to me. I had repeatedly explained that some of those facts required discovery.

I had organized the materials into linked Google Drive folders referenced throughout the amended petition. I prepared those folders in anticipation of presenting and authenticating the exhibits through the evidentiary process described in the court's May orders. I did not understand the links themselves to constitute formal filing or admission of the evidence, and I had not been directed to upload the entire electronic collection through EDMS or provide unrestricted public access before the hearing.

I therefore awaited instructions concerning formal submission, exchange, authentication, or admission of the exhibits at the anticipated hearing. When the court later withdrew the evidentiary process, no alternative procedure was provided through which the organized collection could be presented before the pending matters were decided.

Two distinct evidentiary problems therefore existed: I had organized substantial evidence that I expected to present through the court-directed hearing process,

while other essential facts remained within defendants' control and could be obtained only through discovery.

Later that day, the court entered an order setting the unresolved matters for a sixty-minute Zoom hearing. The order stated that the court anticipated the parties would "likely only need to present legal arguments, not testimony."

This introduced uncertainty, but it did not expressly say that exhibits were prohibited, rescind the May 28 direction that evidence could be presented, or explain whether evidence would remain available for the amendment, estoppel, recasting, and specificity issues even if it would not be considered in deciding dismissal. It also used the qualified word "likely," rather than announcing that the hearing would be restricted exclusively to argument. The evidentiary process previously established by the court therefore had become unclear, but it had not yet been expressly withdrawn.

July 5 — Defendants Again Sought Dismissal Without Discovery

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Amended Petition

Filed July 5, 2024; D0022.

Defendants moved to dismiss the amended petition before discovery had begun. Their motion again challenged whether the pleadings alleged enough facts to sustain the claims.

July 18 — Conflicting Deadlines Required Time to Resist Defendants' New Dismissal Motion

Plaintiff's Notice of Reservation of Right to Resist and Motion to Continue

Filed July 18, 2024; D0024.

Defendants filed a new motion to dismiss on July 5. At the same time, I faced filing deadlines in *Wilson v. State of Iowa and Kim Reynolds for Iowa*. I also explained that I had mistakenly relied on the fifteen-day resistance period contained in an Iowa administrative rule rather than the shorter civil-rule period. I disclosed the mistake, reserved my right to resist, and requested until July 30—the ordinary ten-day response period measured from my competing July 22 deadline—to complete the resistance.

July 19 — The Court Reset the Hearing and Directed Me to Review Rules of Evidence

Judge Currie's **Order Directing Plaintiff to Review Rules of Evidence**

Entered July 19, 2024; D0026.

Judge Currie reset the hearing, and encouraged me to review the Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure and Evidence.

"This case is scheduled for a Zoom hearing on July 23, 2024, at 10:00 a.m. on a variety of motions...."

The hearing must be reset."

"The Iowa Court Rules are available online...."

"Plaintiff, representing herself, is expected to be familiar with and comply with the Rules, especially Chapter 1 (Civil Procedure) and Chapter 5 (Evidence)."

"The Court encourages Plaintiff to review the Rules...."

Because the court had already directed the parties to identify whether they intended to offer evidence, reserved sufficient time for that presentation, and reaffirmed that evidence could be presented before the pending matters were decided, I understood the July 19 direction to review both the civil-procedure and evidence rules as preparation for the upcoming combined hearing.

Nothing in the July 19 order stated that the evidentiary process established by the May orders had been withdrawn.

July 30 — Relying on the Court's Earlier Orders, I Requested an In-Person Hearing to Present the Organized Evidence

Plaintiff's **Motion to Estop, Resistance to Motion to Dismiss, and Request for In-Person Hearing**

Filed July 30, 2024; D0028.

In this filing, I reiterated that discovery and unrepresented evidence were necessary to establish facts supporting my claims. I expressly invoked the evidentiary process established by the court's May 16 and May 28 orders and requested that the combined hearing be held in person so the evidence could be presented.

"Your Honor, in your May 28 order, you wrote ... 'If the parties anticipate that 30 exhibits will be admitted and extensive testimony will be needed at this hearing, the Court is inclined to hold the hearing in person...'

"Per your May 28 order, Your Honor, I request an in-person hearing so that evidence may be presented and discussed."

I again stated that dismissal before discovery would prevent the claims from being established, and that I was nearly finished organizing the evidence I had access to:

"To dismiss this case prior to the discovery phase, wherein the claims I made within the Amended Petition will be shown to have merit, would violate my right to a fair trial."

"I have organized and labeled most of the evidence for this case, as referenced throughout the Amended Petition."

"My evidence ... currently includes 19 folders of categorized text messages, electronic communications ... photographs, and similar documents."

I again explained that dismissal before discovery would prevent facts concerning malice, authorship, knowledge, comparator treatment, and each defendant's respective role from being developed.

I identified particular elements that would become apparent only through evidence or discovery. For example:

"Once I present evidence to the court, including the falsified document which was presumably created by [Defendant Colville], it will become apparent that the defamation she performed was in fact malicious."

"It will become abundantly clear following the discovery phase that [Defendant] Nissen actively participated in defamation and fraud against me."

"Exhibit Q2 ... is a Google Doc folder containing evidence that [Defendant Martinez] screenshotted out-of-context statements I made alongside a phony testimony... Once the out-of-context statements are shown

within their proper context, it will become evident to the court that Denise is in fact liable for defamation and fraud."

Regarding discrimination, I explicitly stated that evidence unavailable before discovery would be needed:

"Direct evidence of discrimination will be shown to the court following the discovery phase, at which point direct evidence may be submitted to the court."

Aug. 3-Oct 4, 2024
Sudden Reversal:
The Court Withdrew the Evidentiary Process
and Dismissed All But One of My Claims "With
Prejudice" Before Discovery

August 3 — Defendants Opposed the Evidentiary Hearing and Mischaracterized the Continuances as Delay

Defendants' Corrected Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss and Resistance to Request for Evidentiary Hearing

Filed August 3, 2024; D0030.

Defendants argued that dismissal must be decided from the pleadings and that an evidentiary hearing was improper. They also listed my prior extension requests and argued that further delay would undermine the function of a motion to dismiss.

Their filing did not address why the court had earlier asked whether evidence would be offered, reserved time for it, or reaffirmed that evidence could be presented at the combined hearing. It treated my request as though it arose independently of the court's May orders.

Their corrected filing stated:

"Defendants strenuously resist another continuance..."

"Iowa courts have specifically held that an evidentiary hearing is not proper at this juncture."

August 9 — The Court Changed Course, Ruling That Evidence Would No Longer Be Allowed at the Hearing

Judge Currie's [Order Retracting the Opportunity to Present Evidence at the Forthcoming Hearing](#)

Entered August 9, 2024; D0032.

This order produced the "sudden reversal" described in the title of this installment.

The court invited evidence, reaffirmed that evidence could be presented, later directed me to review the Rules of Civil Procedure and Evidence, and then withdrew the evidentiary process after I had relied upon the earlier directions—before dismissing fact-dependent claims "with prejudice."

The May 16 order had expressly directed the parties to disclose whether they intended to offer evidence so that sufficient time could be set aside. After I responded that I intended to offer at least thirty exhibits, the May 28 order reaffirmed that evidence could be presented before the substance of the pending matters was decided and described how a hearing involving thirty admitted exhibits and extensive testimony could proceed.

The June 17 order introduced some uncertainty by stating that the parties would "likely" need only legal argument, but it did not prohibit exhibits, withdraw the earlier evidentiary process, or explain that evidence would be excluded from the combined hearing.

The August 9 order then ruled that there was "no reason" to receive evidence and treated my request as procedurally misplaced without reconciling that conclusion with the court's earlier directions.

"Plaintiff's Resistance to Defendants' most recent Motion to Dismiss also includes requests to reschedule the matter for an in-person hearing (rather than the Zoom hearing she previously agreed to) and to give her additional time to present evidence.

As the Court explained in a previous order, a hearing on a motion to dismiss is not an evidentiary hearing.

When determining whether to grant a motion to dismiss, the court views 'the allegations of the petition in the light most favorable to the petitioner' and resolves any doubts in her favor.

The court 'accept[s] as true the petition's well-pleaded factual allegations, but not its legal conclusions.'

Typically, the court 'cannot consider factual allegations contained in the motion [to dismiss] or the documents attached to the motion.'

There should be no reason for the Court to receive evidence at a hearing on a motion to dismiss. The requests are denied for an in-person hearing and that the parties be given additional time so Plaintiff can present evidence.

Furthermore, the Plaintiff was already given one extension of the hearing date to complete her resistance.

The motion to dismiss was filed July 5, more than one month ago. The Court declines to continue the hearing again."

The problem was not merely that the court ultimately applied the general rule that motions to dismiss ordinarily are decided from the pleadings. The problem was that the court had established an evidentiary process for a combined hearing involving several unresolved matters, allowed me to prepare and organize evidence in reliance on that process, and then withdrew it without clearly separating which matters could receive evidence and which could not.

The August 9 order framed my request as unnecessary without acknowledging that I had made it expressly "per" the court's May 28 order. It treated the correct general rule governing motions to dismiss as though that rule resolved the confusion, but did not explain why the court had previously directed the parties to prepare for evidence at a combined hearing that included the dismissal motion.

The Court Did Not Distinguish Between the Different Matters Set for the Combined Hearing

The August 9 order accurately stated the general rule that a motion to dismiss ordinarily is decided from the pleadings rather than outside evidence. But the

scheduled hearing was not limited to defendants' July 5 motion to dismiss.

The court identified four groups of matters to be heard:

1. defendants' February 29 motion to dismiss, alternative motion to recast, and alternative motion for a more specific statement;
2. my March 15 motions to estop and amend;
3. defendants' July 5 motion to dismiss the amended petition; and
4. my renewed July 30 motion to estop.

The court had previously established an evidentiary process for this combined hearing. It had directed the parties to disclose whether evidence would be offered so that sufficient time could be set aside, reaffirmed that evidence could be presented before the substance was decided, and described how thirty admitted exhibits and extensive testimony could be handled.

The August 9 order did not explain whether evidence might remain relevant to amendment, estoppel, recasting, or the demand for a more specific statement while remaining unavailable for the motion to dismiss. Instead, it applied the rule governing dismissal to the hearing as a whole and limited all four matters to one hour of legal argument.

The Court Knew I Was Organizing Evidence and Explaining the Need for Discovery

By August 9, the court was not encountering my evidentiary position for the first time. My March and April filings had already explained that defendants controlled information needed to identify each person's precise role. My May filings repeatedly documented active preparation of the amended petition and organization of the supporting evidence. The May 16 and May 28 orders directed and reaffirmed preparation for the presentation of evidence. The June 17 amended petition then referred throughout to organized exhibits and stated that the pleading should be understood "in context with the evidence."

My July 30 filing made the reliance express. I requested an in-person hearing "per" the May 28 order, identified nineteen organized folders, and explained that additional facts concerning malice, authorship, knowledge, discrimination, and participation would require discovery.

The issue therefore was not simply that I attempted unexpectedly to introduce evidence into an ordinary motion-to-dismiss hearing. The court knew that I was preparing evidence for a combined hearing it had structured, knew that the

amended petition referred to that evidence, and knew that I had identified other facts as unavailable without discovery.

August 12 — I Explained That My Request Resulted from the Court's Earlier Orders

Plaintiff's **Response to Defendants' Reply**

Filed August 12, 2024; D0031

I also argued that discovery was reasonably expected to reveal evidence supporting the alleged conduct and that factual development could require later amendment.

My August 12 filing stated the pleading standard in terms of whether discovery could reveal evidence:

"A theory asserted need only be plausible in order to survive a motion to dismiss ... which requires enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the conduct alleged."

I then cited Iowa Rule 1.457 and quoted its provision allowing pleadings to be amended to conform to evidence:

"Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment..."

I explained that my request for an evidentiary hearing resulted from Judge Currie's earlier order and the procedural uncertainty created by the sequence of rulings:

"My request to schedule the evidentiary hearing was in response to Judge Currie's previous order coupled with my confusion with regard to order of process..."

I also argued that the amended petition should survive where discovery was reasonably expected to reveal evidence supporting the alleged conduct. I cited Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.457 to demonstrate my understanding that pleadings could later be amended as facts emerged through evidentiary development.

Filed several hours before the August 12 hearing, my response clarified:

"I have no objection to the evidentiary hearing being scheduled after today's hearing."

October 4 — The Court Declined to Consider the Exhibits and Dismissed Most Claims With Prejudice

Judge Currie's Order Dismissing All But One Claim w/ Prejudice

Entered October 4, 2024; D0036.

Judge Currie stated:

"Sondra referenced several exhibits in her Amended Petition. The exhibits are apparently saved in a Google Doc folder. The Court does not have access to the exhibits and does not consider them in addressing the motion to dismiss. See *Rucker v. Taylor*, 828 N.W.2d 595, 598 (Iowa 2013) ('[D]istrict courts generally do not consider facts outside the pleadings in evaluating a motion to dismiss.')."

Defendants did not cite *Rucker v. Taylor* in their July 5 motion to dismiss or their August 3 reply opposing an evidentiary hearing. The case first appears in the filings reviewed here in Judge Currie's October 4 ruling, where she cited it to explain why the exhibits referenced in the amended petition would not be considered.

Outside Law Entered the Ruling; the Referenced Evidence Did Not

A court may independently research and apply governing law, and legal authority is not the same thing as outside factual evidence. But the practical imbalance here is difficult to ignore. The court independently supplied additional legal authority supporting the exclusion of my exhibits while declining to consider the evidence those exhibits contained—even though the petition referenced them and the court had previously directed the parties to prepare for an evidentiary presentation.

The result was procedurally one-sided: additional legal support could enter the decision against me, but the referenced factual record supporting my claims could not. The court then dismissed most claims with prejudice for factual

insufficiency before discovery had revealed information I had repeatedly identified as being within defendants' control.

This is one of the structural problems documented throughout *Iowa's Broken Judiciary*. The legal system permits judges and attorneys to locate, introduce, and apply specialized precedent at any stage, while a self-represented litigant may lose claims because the facts needed to satisfy that precedent remain inaccessible, excluded, or undiscovered.

Rucker may explain why outside evidence was not considered in deciding the motion to dismiss. It does not explain why most claims were dismissed "with prejudice" after the court had repeatedly been placed on notice that facts involving authorship, knowledge, participation, coordination, and malice could not be fully developed without discovery. The court could have declined to consider outside evidence without permanently foreclosing claims whose missing details were alleged to be within defendants' control. Instead, it did both.

The Court Recited a Plaintiff-Favorable Standard but Used Unresolved Facts Against the Claims

The court stated that the allegations had to be viewed in the light most favorable to me and that reasonable doubts were to be resolved in my favor. But that protection appears largely absent from the result.

Where authorship, knowledge, malice, coordination, comparator treatment, and individual participation remained uncertain, the ruling treated the absence of fully developed detail as a reason for dismissal—even though I had repeatedly identified those exact subjects as matters requiring defendants' documents, private communications, interrogatory answers, and testimony.

A plaintiff-favorable standard should not operate only as introductory language. It should determine how uncertainty is resolved. Here, uncertainty arising from defendants' control of essential information was repeatedly converted into a defect in my pleading.

The court dismissed every claim except one libel claim. Most of the dismissed claims were dismissed with prejudice, preventing them from being reasserted in this action.

That statement completed the procedural circle. The court had directed preparation for evidence, received repeated notice that I was organizing it, later withdrew the opportunity to present it, and then noted that the exhibits were inaccessible and would not be considered.

At the same time, the court dismissed most claims for insufficient factual allegations before discovery had revealed the information I had repeatedly identified as being within defendants' control. Most of those dismissals were with prejudice.

I do not contend that the court was required to use outside evidence to decide whether the amended petition stated a claim. The narrower and more serious issue is that the court's own orders led me to prepare for an evidentiary process involving several pending matters, did not clearly distinguish which matters could receive evidence, withdrew the process after I had relied on it, and then imposed dismissal with prejudice before either the organized evidence or discovery could inform amendment and further factual development.

Why I Experienced This Sequence as Gaslighting

I had not invented the expectation that evidence would be presented. The court had expressly directed the parties to prepare for it, explained why time should be reserved, reaffirmed the opportunity after I disclosed the volume of evidence, and described how the evidentiary presentation could occur. The later order then treated my request as unnecessary without squarely acknowledging the directions on which I had relied.

I had spent weeks expanding the petition and organizing the evidentiary record in response to that process, only to have the process withdrawn and my reliance reframed as procedural misunderstanding.

The Central Contradiction: The Facts the Court Found Missing Were Either in Evidence It Declined to Receive or in Defendants' Control

This was not a situation in which I simply failed to include facts already known to me. From the beginning, I repeatedly explained that evidence and information necessary to identify the defendants' precise roles remained within their possession.

On March 15, I explained that some claims could be made more specific only after discovery and warned that dismissal would prevent evidence and testimony

from being presented. On April 1, I stated that defendants' lack of transparency had made it "impossible for me to determine the exact roles of each party." I specifically identified interrogatories and depositions as necessary to determine who said what, what each defendant knew, and what had been submitted to the Iowa Civil Rights Commission.

On July 30, I again explained that discovery and the evidentiary record would establish malice, fraud, discrimination, and each defendant's involvement. I identified nineteen organized folders of communications, photographs, messages, and other records and requested an in-person hearing under the court's May 28 order.

Despite those repeated explanations, discovery never occurred before most claims were dismissed. The court withdrew the evidentiary process it had established for the combined hearing, declined to consider the exhibits referenced in the amended petition, and dismissed claims for asserted factual deficiencies—including facts I had repeatedly explained could not be fully known without defendants' documents and testimony.

The missing facts therefore fell into two categories: evidence I had already organized but the court declined to receive, and information controlled by defendants that could only be obtained through discovery. Neither avenue was permitted before most claims were dismissed as factually insufficient.

The withdrawal caused concrete prejudice: facts already connected to an organized evidentiary record were excluded, facts controlled by defendants were treated as pleading defects, and dismissal "with prejudice" prevented those claims from being clarified after discovery.

In other words, I was required to allege factual details that I had repeatedly explained were either contained in evidence the court would not receive or held by defendants who had not yet been subjected to discovery.

Even Without Considering the Exhibits' Contents, the Pleading Identified a Concrete Evidentiary Record

The court stated that it did not have access to the linked exhibits and therefore would not consider them when deciding the motion to dismiss. But the petition did not refer vaguely to evidence that might someday exist. It identified organized exhibits tied to particular agreements, communications, statements, defendants, and disputed submissions.

Even if the court declined to consider the contents of the linked exhibits, the amended petition's repeated references to identified exhibits were themselves part of the pleading's context. Those references placed the court on notice that

the allegations were tied to specific communications, documents, timelines, and disputed submissions—not merely unsupported speculation.

The exhibit labels also reinforced what I had repeatedly explained: some evidence was already organized, while other essential information—such as authorship, knowledge, private communications, and coordination—remained within defendants’ control.

Under a standard requiring reasonable doubts to be resolved in my favor, that context should at minimum have weighed against permanently dismissing the claims before discovery and before allowing a clearer amendment.

Why the Dismissed Claims Should Be Reopened

I did not merely assert that evidence existed somewhere outside the pleadings. I identified specific factual questions that could not be answered without defendants’ records, communications, and testimony. The following sections examine how the October 4 ruling treated those claims and why dismissal—especially dismissal “with prejudice”—was unwarranted.

- 1. Promissory Estoppel — The Natural-Disaster Hypothetical and the “Volunteer” Label**
- 2. Fraud — Authorship, Alteration, Knowledge, and Submission Required Discovery**
- 3. Defamation — Malice and Participation Depended on Information Controlled by Defendants**
- 4. Discrimination — Statutory Coverage, Public Accommodation, Comparator Evidence, and Constitutional Equality**
- 5. The Right to Trial by Jury — Fact-Dependent Claims Were Foreclosed Before Fact-Finding**
- 6. Dismissal “With Prejudice” — Why Amendment or Discovery Was the Less Drastic Remedy**
- 7. Conspiracy and Coordinated Conduct — What the 2024 Dismissal Prevented From Developing**

Promissory Estoppel — The Court Replaced Party Conduct With a Natural-Disaster Hypothetical

In dismissing my promissory-estoppel claim, the court reasoned that if a derecho had destroyed the garden, I would not have completed the growing season or been entitled to compensation for prior volunteer work.

But a natural disaster was not what I alleged happened.

I alleged that defendants authorized the garden and prairie projects, represented that I was “taking the lead” and “in charge” for the growing season, accepted months of planning, purchases, labor, and improvements, and then terminated the arrangement under circumstances I alleged were false and discriminatory.

A derecho would have been an external event beyond the parties’ control. My claim concerned the conduct of the parties who induced, accepted, and benefited from my reliance. The analogy therefore removed defendants’ agency from the facts under review and treated an allegedly retaliatory repudiation as though it were indistinguishable from weather.

Exhibit C documents authorization, continuing coordination, approval of the prairie proposal, statements that I was “taking the lead” and “in charge,” the promised café discount, substantial performance, and defendants’ later repudiation of the same arrangements.

The "Volunteer" Label Did Not Capture the Agreements I Alleged

The derecho analogy was not the only problem. The ruling also relied heavily on language in my hurried 2024 pleading describing some of my work as “volunteer” work. I used that term because I was not receiving an ordinary wage—not because the work was unsolicited, unauthorized, or performed without agreements and promised benefits.

Defendants used the label to blur two different concepts: performing unpaid labor and performing labor under express, oral, implied-in-fact, or reliance-based agreements.

The pleaded relationship was not merely that I performed charitable work and later regretted it. I alleged that defendants requested, approved, authorized, directed, encouraged, and benefited from continuing projects; represented that I was “taking the lead” and “in charge”; provided project instructions; promised benefits connected to the work; and then prevented further performance after approximately six months of reliance.

My 2026 Revised Second Amended Petition pleaded the Garden and Prairie Agreements first as oral or implied-in-fact contracts. It pleaded promissory estoppel in the alternative if the court concluded that no enforceable contract

existed. It alleged that I performed substantial work without separately charging for my services because I expected the benefits, opportunities, and consideration promised under the agreements.

That fuller pleading was never accepted. Because the 2024 dismissal was entered “with prejudice,” the language of the earlier, rushed petition became a barrier to placing the clearer contractual and alternative equitable theories before the court.

The Altered ICRC Submission Required Discovery Into Authorship, Knowledge, and Malice

The altered ICRC submission reversed the apparent chronology of my communications with Willa Colville and framed my April 4 message as though it had been sent after she told me to stop contacting her on April 7.

Before discovery, however, I could not know who arranged the screenshots, who changed or inserted the displayed date, who wrote the caption, what Colville supplied to Sharon Stewart, or what Stewart and the other defendants knew when the material was submitted.

If discovery showed that Colville created the altered presentation and knowingly supplied it for submission, that evidence could support knowledge of falsity, reckless disregard for the truth, and coordinated participation. Those were not facts I could establish merely by inspecting the final document. They required communications, document production, interrogatories, and testimony from defendants.

This illustrates the central problem: the court treated the absence of fully developed allegations as a pleading defect even where the missing information concerned defendants’ own private conduct.

Fraud and Defamation Involved Concealed Conduct and Information Controlled by Defendants

The **fraud** and defamation claims concerned conduct that could not be reconstructed solely from the final documents in the ICRC file. Determining who created, altered, supplied, approved, or knowingly relied upon the disputed materials required access to private communications, document history, interrogatory responses, and testimony.

The problem was intensified by timing. I obtained only part of the ICRC record fifty-five days before the deadline to commence the action. I therefore had to

plead from the final submissions available to me while identifying the factual questions that could be answered only through discovery.

Exhibits D, E, and F, later organized and submitted with my proposed Revised Second Amended Petition, compare defendants' administrative statements with contemporaneous communications that I contend materially contradict them.

The Fraud Claim Against Some or All of the Defendants

Fraud, by its very nature, often involves concealment, trickery, deception, fabrication of evidence, and the like.

Definitions of Fraud:

Deceit, deception, artifice, or trickery operating prejudicially on the rights of another, and so intended, by inducing him to part with property or surrender some legal right.

23 Am J2d Fraud § 2.

Anything calculated to deceive another to his prejudice and accomplishing the purpose, whether it be an act, a word, silence, the suppression of the truth, or other device contrary to the plain rules of common honesty.

23 Am J 2d Fraud § 2.

A knowing misrepresentation or knowing concealment of a material fact made to induce another to act to his or her detriment. Fraud is usually a **tort, but in some cases (especially when the conduct is willful) may be a crime.**

Black's Law Dictionary 10th Ed.

These definitions describe the type of conduct alleged in my fraud claim: knowing deception, concealment, alteration, and the use of misleading materials to affect my rights in the ICRC proceeding.

The following exhibits are central to my defamation (and fraud) claims:

Exhibit D — Allegations of Stalking and Harassment: Statements v. Contemporaneous Communications

Exhibit E — Allegations Concerning Defendant Martinez and Contextual Communications

Exhibit F — Statement by Defendant Esker and Contradictory Prior Communications

On June 15, 2026, I submitted these exhibits with my renewed request for leave to file the **Revised Second Amended Petition**. As addressed in **Part Four, *Dangerous Precedent***, leave was denied. The court therefore has not evaluated the fuller pleading and organized exhibits together on their merits.

Exhibit D-3 compares the original communications with the version submitted to the ICRC. I allege that the submitted presentation was altered or arranged in a manner that reversed the apparent chronology and materially changed the impression created by the exchange.

The filings and orders described above show that I was never given a meaningful opportunity to present this evidence before most claims were dismissed.

Nor could I determine before discovery which defendants created, altered, supplied, approved, adopted, or knowingly relied upon the disputed materials. Those were not reasons to dismiss the fraud claim permanently; they were the factual subjects discovery was needed to resolve.

The Defamation Claims Against Colville, Martinez, and Esker

Discovery was necessary to determine which of several possible scenarios occurred:

- Colville created or arranged the disputed presentation and supplied it to Stewart while also making allegedly defamatory statements.
- Colville supplied the original communications, after which Stewart or another person altered, rearranged, captioned, or otherwise presented them misleadingly before submission to the ICRC.
- More than one defendant knew about or participated in the creation, alteration, approval, or use of the disputed presentation.

If discovery showed that Colville knowingly created or supplied a materially altered presentation to support defamatory accusations, that evidence could support a finding of knowledge of falsity, reckless disregard for the truth, or actual malice—issues directly relevant to overcoming any qualified privilege asserted for the publication.

At minimum, those unresolved factual possibilities warranted discovery rather than dismissal before the relevant communications, authorship, and knowledge could be established.

The Discrimination Claim Turned on Multiple Fact-Dependent and Constitutional Questions

The discrimination claim did not depend upon only one statutory theory. It implicated discrimination arising from the parties' working and contractual relationship, discrimination in public accommodation, and Iowa's independent constitutional guarantee of equality.

As to the parties' working relationship, the amended petition alleged that I performed substantial, continuing work under agreements with the businesses; that defendants exercised control over the projects; that the work benefited their operations and property; and that I received promised benefits, including a 50% café discount. I argued that the actual substance of the relationship—not merely the label "volunteer"—required examination.

Whether the relationship fell within the employment protections of the Iowa Civil Rights Act involved fact-intensive questions concerning remuneration, control, duration, assigned responsibilities, promised benefits, and defendants' acceptance of my performance.

The public-accommodation theory involved a different informational barrier. Defendants argued that I had not identified similarly situated non-transgender patrons who generated complaints but were permitted to remain. But information concerning complaints against other patrons, internal discussions, comparator treatment, and the reasons for defendants' decision was not reasonably available to me before discovery.

The Equality Argument Extended Beyond the Iowa Civil Rights Act

My discrimination argument did not end with the Iowa Civil Rights Act. Article I, section 6 of the Iowa Constitution provides:

"All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation; the general assembly shall not grant to any citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or immunities, which, upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens."

Iowa's constitutional equality tradition predates the modern Iowa Civil Rights Act. In *Clark v. Board of School Directors*, 24 Iowa 266, 277 (1868), the Iowa Supreme Court rejected racial segregation in public education eighty-six years before the United States Supreme Court decided *Brown v. Board of Education*. The court explained that a school board could not deny a child admission to a particular school because of

“nationality, religion, color, clothing or the like.”

Its importance is that Iowa's constitutional commitment to equality did not begin with the Iowa Civil Rights Act of 1965 and cannot be understood solely by examining the classifications expressly enumerated in that statute.

As the Drake Law Review's retrospective on *Clark* explains, Iowa may provide its residents greater constitutional protection than the federal Constitution requires, so long as doing so does not violate federal law. The larger constitutional question in my case was therefore not exhausted by asking whether the relationship fit perfectly into a conventional statutory employment category.

My allegations concerned a transgender woman who entered continuing agreements with businesses, performed substantial authorized work, received promised benefits, was abruptly excluded under accusations she alleged were false and discriminatory, and was denied information concerning how non-transgender patrons or workers were treated in comparable circumstances.

Those allegations raised questions requiring both factual and legal development: whether defendants treated similarly situated non-transgender people differently; whether the reasons given for my exclusion were genuine or pretextual; whether the Iowa Civil Rights Act applied through employment, remuneration, retaliation, or public accommodation; and whether Iowa's constitutional equality guarantee supplied an independent or supplementary basis for relief.

I recognize that applying article I, section 6 to private defendants presents additional questions, including the existence of governmental action, judicial enforcement, or another legally recognized basis for constitutional application. But those questions required briefing, amendment, factual development, and preservation for appellate review. They should not have been foreclosed indirectly by reducing the relationship to the word “volunteer” and dismissing the discrimination claim “with prejudice.”

The court did not reject a fully developed constitutional argument after discovery and complete briefing. The “with prejudice” ruling prevented that deeper

argument from ever being developed in this action.

Why This Unresolved Question Now Matters Even More

The importance of this unresolved constitutional question has grown since the events underlying this case. Iowa has since removed “gender identity” from the classes expressly listed in the Iowa Civil Rights Act.

My claims arose while gender identity was expressly protected by the Act. But the later legislative removal demonstrates why Iowa’s constitutional equality guarantee cannot be treated as historically irrelevant. If protection depends exclusively upon whatever classifications the legislature chooses to include in an ordinary statute at a particular moment, a civil right may disappear from the statutory text through a single legislative act.

Clark v. Board of School Directors, 24 Iowa 266, 277 (1868), demonstrates that Iowa’s equality tradition is older than the Iowa Civil Rights Act. My case could have provided an opportunity to develop whether and how that tradition bears upon discrimination against transgender Iowans, contractual workers, unpaid workers performing under agreements, and persons whose relationships do not fit neatly within conventional statutory categories.

Dismissal “with prejudice” prevented that discussion before it could occur. It foreclosed not only factual development, but the opportunity to present, preserve, and seek appellate review of legal arguments that have since become significantly more consequential.

The Right to Trial by Jury Was Never Reached

The Iowa Constitution declares:

“The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate.”

Iowa Const. art. I, § 9.

A jury cannot resolve factual disputes it is never permitted to hear. By dismissing fact-dependent claims before discovery—while treating unresolved questions about motive, knowledge, comparator treatment, authorship, participation, and the nature of the parties’ agreements against me—the court did more than narrow the case. It prevented the ordinary fact-finding process from occurring.

Courts decide legal questions, while juries ordinarily determine disputed facts, credibility, intent, and competing inferences. But that division cannot function

when the factual record is cut off at the pleading stage. Without discovery and factual development, I was also denied the opportunity to show that the case differed from the precedents defendants invoked, that existing doctrines did not fit the actual relationship between the parties, or that those doctrines warranted reconsideration in light of the developed record.

This was particularly important to the discrimination claim. The relationship did not fit neatly into a conventional paid-employment category, but neither was it accurately described as casual, unsolicited volunteerism. It involved continuing agreements, assigned and approved responsibilities, project-management work, promised benefits, a café discount, reliance, substantial performance, and defendants' acceptance of the resulting benefits.

My discrimination theory also extended beyond whether the relationship fit precisely within the Iowa Civil Rights Act. It implicated public accommodation and Iowa's independent constitutional commitment to equality. Whether existing precedent governed, could be distinguished, or required reconsideration—and whether statutory or constitutional protections reached the facts alleged—should have been examined on a developed factual record rather than foreclosed through an incomplete label.

The same problem affected promissory estoppel, fraud, defamation, and unjust enrichment. Those claims depended upon factual questions concerning what defendants promised, what they authorized, what they accepted, who created or altered disputed materials, what each defendant knew, why they acted, and whether their later descriptions were truthful. Those questions were never tested through document production, interrogatories, depositions, credibility determinations, or jury fact-finding.

Here, the court stated that well-pleaded facts had to be accepted as true and reasonable doubts resolved in my favor. Yet most claims were dismissed “with prejudice” while central facts remained undeveloped and while I had repeatedly explained that defendants controlled the information needed to answer them.

The constitutional guarantee cannot meaningfully protect the fact-finding role of the jury when fact-dependent claims are permanently foreclosed before the relevant evidence is developed, before competing inferences are tested, and before a jury can determine what occurred.

Dismissal With Prejudice Converted Unresolved Facts Into Permanent Loss of Claims

The most severe feature of the October 4 ruling was not merely that most claims were dismissed. It was that they were dismissed with prejudice.

The court did not simply require a clearer pleading, permit another amendment, identify limited defects to be corrected, or allow discovery into facts held by defendants. It permanently foreclosed most claims in this action at a stage when the court was required to accept well-pleaded facts as true and resolve reasonable inferences in my favor.

That consequence was especially harsh where I had repeatedly identified the missing information, explained why defendants controlled it, organized the evidence available to me, and relied on the court's own directions concerning an evidentiary hearing.

The harm did not end with the October 4 ruling. The dismissal fixed the rushed 2024 pleading in place before discovery could clarify the defendants' roles and before I could reorganize the claims around the fuller documentary record.

When I later distinguished the Garden and Prairie Agreements from unpaid "volunteer" work, pleaded contract and promissory-estoppel theories in the alternative, added abuse-of-process and conspiracy allegations, and attached Exhibits A through G, defendants could invoke the earlier dismissal as a reason those fuller theories should not be heard.

Part Three, *Plausible Deniability*, documents the intervening procedural conduct that consumed the time and opportunity needed to correct the record. Part Four, *Dangerous Precedent*, addresses the later denial of leave to file the fuller pleading. But the barrier originated here: dismissal "with prejudice" converted a hurried, pre-discovery amendment into a permanent limitation on what the case could become.

Why Reconsideration Is Warranted

The October 4 dismissal rested substantially on asserted factual deficiencies. But the facts identified as missing were either tied to the organized evidentiary record the court declined to receive or concerned information that could not be obtained without discovery from defendants.

The withdrawal of the evidentiary process materially affected what the court was permitted to consider, while the absence of discovery left other essential facts undeveloped. Dismissal "with prejudice" then prevented amendment and later factual development from correcting the asserted deficiencies.

Reconsideration is warranted because the outcome converted court-created procedural uncertainty, reliance on the court's own orders, and the absence of

discovery into permanent grounds for dismissal.

What the 2024 Dismissal Prevented Me From Developing: Conspiracy and Coordinated Conduct Required Access to Private Communications

My June 17, 2024 Amended Petition did not include a separately stated conspiracy claim. At that point, I was attempting under substantial time pressure to respond to defendants' motions to dismiss, recast, and require a more specific statement while also organizing a large evidentiary record.

Amendment was not then barred, however, and the absence of a separately labeled conspiracy count did not make the underlying questions of coordination irrelevant. I had already identified the need for discovery into who created or altered disputed materials, who supplied them, what each defendant knew, and whether defendants coordinated their statements and submissions.

In 2026, after I had finally been able to reorganize the pleading and assemble the supporting evidence into Exhibits A through G, I expressly alleged conspiracy and coordinated conduct in my proposed Revised Second Amended Petition. The revised pleading alleged that multiple defendants supplied, adopted, repeated, relied upon, or incorporated statements and materials that appeared mutually corroborative and portrayed me as engaging in harassment, stalking, discrimination, boundary violations, and other misconduct.

The proposed amendment was accompanied by organized exhibits addressing the ICRC proceedings, the parties' agreements, the allegedly altered or misleading submissions, the individual defendants' statements, and the subsequent litigation history.

The intervening procedural history leading to that proposed amendment is addressed in Part Three, *Plausible Deniability*. Judge Doyle's later denial of leave to file the Revised Second Amended Petition is addressed in **Part Four, *Dangerous Precedent***.

A civil **conspiracy** generally concerns an agreement or coordinated action by two or more people to accomplish an unlawful result or to use unlawful means. Such coordination is rarely proved through a written confession. It is commonly inferred from private communications, shared knowledge, timing, mutually reinforcing statements, and coordinated participation.

Before discovery, I could not determine who created or altered the disputed presentation, who supplied it to Sharon Stewart, who approved its submission, what each defendant knew, or whether multiple defendants coordinated their accounts. Those questions were the factual core of whether the submissions represented isolated conduct by separate individuals or coordinated action by several participants.

Definitions of Conspiracy:

"An agreement between two or more persons to accomplish together a criminal or unlawful act or to achieve by criminal or unlawful means an act not in itself criminal or unlawful."

16 Am J2d Consp § 1.

"Conspiracy is also a wrong which will constitute a cause for a civil action."

16 Am J2d Consp § 43.

Next: Part Three — Plausible Deniability

The October 4 ruling did not end the case. One libel claim survived, and the proceedings entered a new phase in which defendants continued resisting factual development while placing additional disputed characterizations into an increasingly complex record. The case was later reassigned to another judge, who inherited a procedural history that had become progressively harder to reconstruct. I was repeatedly forced to respond to defendants' framing while also attempting to preserve the surviving claim and obtain discovery.

Part Three, *Plausible Deniability*, follows what occurred after the "Sudden Reversal": the surviving claim, the continuing effort to obtain discovery, the changing judicial assignments, and the procedural conditions that later allowed defendants to argue that the fuller facts and theories had arrived too late.

Part Four, *Dangerous Precedent*, will address the later denial of leave to file the exhibit-supported Revised Second Amended Petition and the eventual summary-judgment ruling—a ruling that, unless reversed, could establish sweeping protection for materially false or misleading submissions made during the earliest stage of Iowa's civil-rights process.

Part Three: Plausible Deniability

A person with a backpack is walking away from the camera on a paved path that leads towards a large, historic building with a prominent clock tower. The sky is overcast and dramatic. The path is flanked by trees and a lamppost. A banner on the lamppost reads "IOWA STATE UNIVERSITY".

WILSON V. RELIABLE STREET INC., ET AL.
PART THREE
PLAUSIBLE DENIABILITY
**HOW A FRAGMENTED DOCKET,
A FALSE DELAY NARRATIVE,
AND A NOMINALLY GRANTED
CONTINUANCE PRESERVED
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