IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
CENTRAL DIVISION

ALEXANDRA DISTANCE MARIE WILSON, AMELIA CURELL, KAYLARA HOADLEY, VICTORIA WHITTEN, Plaintiff, v. DONALD J. TRUMP, KIM REYNOLDS, BRENNA BIRD, CHRISTOPHER J. DEIST, KEVIN ALONS, MIKE BOUSSELOT, DOUG CAMPBELL, MARK COSTELLO, DAN DAWSON, ROCKY DE WITT, ADRIAN DICKEY, DAWN DRISCOLL, LYNN EVANS, JULIAN GARRETT, JESSE GREEN, KERRY GRUENHAGEN, DENNIS GUTH, MIKE KLIMESH, CARRIE KOELKER, TIM KRAAYENBRINK, MARK LOFGREN, CHARLI MCCLINTOCK, MIKE PIKE, JEFF REICHMAN, DAVID ROWLEY, KEN ROZENBOOM, SANDY SALMON, JASON SCHULTZ, ANNETTE SWEENEY, TOM SHIPLEY, DAVE SIRES, JEFF TAYLOR, KARA WARME, SCOTT WEBSTER, CHERIELYNN WESTRICH, JACK WHITVER, DAN ZUMBACH, JERRY BEHN, BRETT BARKER, DAVID BLOM, JANE BLOOMINGDALE, BROOKE BODEN, JACOB BOSSMAN, STEVEN BRADLEY, MARK CISNEROS, TAYLOR COLLINS, TOM DETERMANN, ZACH DIEKEN, JON DUNWELL, SAMANTHA FETT, DEAN FISHER, JASON GEARHART, DAN GEHLBACH, THOMAS GERHOLD, CINDY GOLDING, PAT GRASSLEY, BILL GUSTOFF, HELENA HAYES, ROBERT HENDERSON, CHRISTIAN HERMANSON, STEVEN HOLT, HEATHER HORA, THOMAS JENEARY, CRAIG JOHNSON, MEGAN JONES, BOBBY KAUFMANN, BARB KNIFF MCCULLA, SHANNON LATHAM, JUDD LAWLER, SHANNON	No. 4:25-cv-000116-SHL-WPK **INITIAL REVIEW ORDER**

LUNDGREN, JOSHUA MEGGERS, ANN MEYER, GARY MOHR, TOM MOORE, CARTER NORDMAN, MATTHEW RINKER, MIKE SEXTON, JEFF SHIPLEY, BRENT SIEGRIST, TRAVIS SITZMANN, JENNIFER SMITH, RAY SORENSEN, HENRY STONE, MARK THOMPSON, CHARLEY THOMSON, MIKE VONDRAN, RYAN WELDON, SAM WENGRYN, SKYLER WHEELER, CRAIG STEVEN WILLIAMS, JOHN WILLS, JOHN WILZ, MATT WINDSCHITL, DEVON WOOD, DEREK WULFF, DAVID YOUNG, REPUBLICAN PARTY OF IOWA, REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, JOHN AND JANE DOES, Defendants.	

Plaintiffs Alexandra Distance Marie ("Sondra") Wilson, Kaylara Hoadley, Victoria Whitten and Amelia Curell filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985, 1986, and 18 U.S.C. § 1964 without the assistance of counsel. (ECF 1.) Plaintiffs allege that Defendants—federal and state officials, political parties, and others—have conspired to violate the rights of transgender persons. Plaintiffs supplemented their filing with a "criminal complaint" purporting to bring criminal charges against substantially the same set of defendants related to the same conduct. (ECF 2.) Plaintiffs seek a preliminary injunction against these and numerous other defendants; to stay a pending state court case involving Wilson; to join that state court case with this case; and for an order granting Wilson access to victims' services. (ECF 7; ECF 8; ECF 9; ECF 10.) Additionally, Plaintiffs seek leave to proceed without prepayment of fees, to redact the complaint, and to file electronically. (ECF 4; ECF 5; ECF 10.) They also appear to be raising their claims on behalf of a putative class.

I. BACKGROUND LEGAL STANDARDS.

The Court considers Plaintiffs' Complaint in the context of her Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. (ECF 4.) A court can allow a party to begin an action "without prepayment of fees or security" if the party submits an affidavit that shows he or she cannot "pay such fees or give security therefor." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). "The in forma pauperis statute . . . is designed to ensure 'that indigent persons will have equal access to the judicial system.'" *Lee v. McDonald's Corp.*, 231 F.3d 456, 458 (8th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). However, the

statute also requires a district court to dismiss a case if "the action or appeal is . . . frivolous or malicious." 28 U.S.C § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)). "[A] complaint, containing as it does both factual allegations and legal conclusions, is frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).

"A *pro se* complaint must be liberally construed and '*pro se* litigants are held to a lesser pleading standard than other parties.'" *Topchian v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.*, 760 F.3d 843, 849 (8th Cir. 2014) (citing *Estelle v. Gamble*, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) and quoting *Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki*, 552 U.S. 389, 402 (2008)). But "they still must allege sufficient facts to support the claims advanced." *Stone v. Harry*, 364 F.3d 912. 914 (8th Cir. 2004). Although Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) does not require detailed factual allegations, "it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted). "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. . . . Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." *Id*. at 678–79 (citations omitted).

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS.

A. Plaintiffs' Complaint Does Not State Viable Claims for Relief.

i. Summary of Claims.

Plaintiffs filed this action as a putative class action lawsuit "for violations of Congressionally created rights secured by the Medicaid and Medicare Act and guaranteed under the Ninth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States." (ECF 1, p. 4.) Plaintiffs bring claims for conspiracy to interfere with civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985; neglect to prevent civil rights violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1986; and for civil remedies under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO") pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1964. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants conspired to "violate the rights of, and cause personal injuries to, a class of persons currently protected against discrimination by the Iowa Civil Rights Act ("ICRA"), Civil Rights Act ("CRA"), Equality Clause of the Iowa Constitution, Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and American Common Law." (ECF 1, pp. 7–8.) In particular, they allege the Iowa Supreme Court determined "(1) surgeries for transgender person are in fact medically necessary and (2) the [ICRA] prohibits discrimination against transgender persons from being able to receive access to Medicare or Medicaid" (citing *Good v. Iowa Dep't of Hum. Servs.*, 924 N.W.2d 853

(Iowa 2019)), and that the Medicare and Medicaid Act provides further protections against discrimination. (Id., p. 8.)

Plaintiffs assert that Defendants have worked to foster a political climate that is hostile to transgender persons. They provide the following examples in support of their allegations:

- In May 2019, some of the Defendants passed Iowa House File 766, which included a section specifying that state or local governments were not required to provide for "sex reassignment surgery or any other cosmetic, reconstructive, or plastic surgery procedure related to transsexualism, hermaphroditism, gender identity disorder, or body dysmorphic disorder." (Id., p. 9.) Plaintiffs assert that medically necessary surgeries for transgender Iowans were canceled as a result. After a state district court judge determined the provision violated the ICRA and Iowa Constitution, a spokesperson for Iowa Governor Kim Reynolds made statements that Plaintiffs argue show prejudice and animus against transgender persons. (Id., p. 10.) Plaintiffs allege that transgender persons were further harmed when they were forced to wait for care while the State appealed the ruling. *See Vasquez v. Iowa Dep't of Hum. Servs*., 990 N.W.2d 661 (Iowa 2023).
- Plaintiff Sondra Wilson filed a case against the State of Iowa and Governor Reynolds which was dismissed based on "incorrect information" and that she was denied an appeal based upon "legal shenanigans." (ECF 1, p. 11.)
- President Donald Trump, colluding with other parties, issued multiple executive orders targeting transgender persons, made false and defamatory statements regarding transgender persons, and threatened to cut funding from universities. (Id., pp. 11–12.)
- In February 2025, some of the Defendants passed Iowa Senate File 418, which removes "gender identity" as a protected class from the ICRA. After signing the bill into law—which Plaintiffs characterize as extortion—Governor Reynolds released a statement indicating Defendants' intent to deny transgender persons medically necessary services. (Id., pp. 12–13.)

Plaintiffs ask the Court to "immediately issue an injunctive protective order to prevent any behind-the-scenes actions targeting transgender persons; these are only some examples." (Id., p. 13.) Plaintiffs further request leave to amend their Petition as they work to gather additional evidence. (Id., p. 15.)

ii. Analysis.

There are several fatal problems with Plaintiffs' claims. First, although Wilson may represent herself pro se, she is not an attorney and cannot represent others. A plaintiff "may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel." 28 U.S.C. § 1654. "That statute allows litigants to advance their own interests in court without assistance of a licensed attorney, but it does not extend to allow those who are not attorneys to represent other people." *Ruesga v. Boettger*,

No. 4:21-CV-00190-RGE-SBJ, 2022 WL 2187801, at *3 (S.D. Iowa May 11, 2022) (citing *Crozier for A.C. v. Westside Cmty. Sch. Dist*., 973 F.3d 882, 887 (8th Cir. 2020)); *see also Perkins v. Holder*, No. CIV. 13-2874 PAM/FLN, 2014 WL 755378, at *5 (D. Minn. Feb. 26, 2014) ("*[P]ro se* litigants can never represent the rights, claims and interests of other parties in a class action lawsuit (or otherwise)."), *aff'd*, No. 14-2953 (8th Cir. Dec. 9, 2014). Because Wilson is not an attorney (ECF 3, p. 8), she cannot file this case on behalf of anyone other than herself. The Court therefore must limit its review to Wilson's individual claims.

This leads to a second problem: Wilson lacks standing to bring most or all of her claims. "Article III standing must be decided first by the court and presents a question of justiciability; if it is lacking, a federal court has no subject-matter jurisdiction over the claim." *Religious Sisters of Mercy v. Becerra*, 55 F.4th 583, 601 (8th Cir. 2022) (quoting *Schumacher v. SC Data Ctr., Inc.*, 912 F.3d 1104, 1105 (8th Cir. 2019)). "The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing standing" and standing must exist throughout the case. *Id.* (quoting *Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus*, 573 U.S. 149, 158 (2014)). "To establish Article III standing, a party invoking federal jurisdiction must show (1) that the plaintiff suffered an injury in fact, (2) a causal relationship between the injury and the challenged conduct, and (3) that a favorable decision will likely redress the injury." *Id.* at 602 (quoting *Sch. of the Ozarks, Inc. v. Biden*, 41 F.4th 992, 997 (8th Cir. 2022)). A plaintiff "cannot use someone else's injury to establish [her] own standing, as a plaintiff 'generally must assert [her] own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest [her] claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.'" *Hull Partners, LLC v. Clean Fuels All. Am*., 642 F. Supp. 3d 809, 818 (S.D. Iowa 2022) (quoting *Warth v. Seldin*, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975)).

As to the first element, "[a]n injury in fact is 'an invasion of a legally protected interest that is concrete and particularized and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.'" *McNaught v. Nolen*, 76 F.4th 764, 769 (8th Cir. 2023) (quoting *Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins*, 578 U.S. 330, 339 (2016) (internal quotation marks omitted)). "As to the concrete-harm requirement, we 'assess whether the alleged injury to the plaintiff has a close relationship to a harm traditionally recognized as providing a basis for a lawsuit in American courts.'" *Id.* (quoting *TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez*, 594 U.S. 413, 424 (2021) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus, in addition to physical or monetary injury, "[v]arious intangible harms can also be concrete." *TransUnion LLC*, 594 U.S. at 425. This could include, for example, "reputational harms, disclosure of private information, and intrusion upon seclusion. . . . [and] "harms specified by the Constitution itself" including

abridgement of free speech and infringement of free exercise. *Id.* A plaintiff does not, however, suffer an injury in fact based on "only a general legal, moral, ideological, or policy objection to a particular government action." *Food & Drug Admin. v. All. for Hippocratic Med*., 602 U.S. 367, 381 (2024) ("For example, a citizen does not have standing to challenge a government regulation simply because the plaintiff believes that the government is acting illegally.").

Wilson's Complaint does not explicitly allege that she is transgender, but the filings, collectively, make this apparent. The Complaint includes the heading "NOTICE OF CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT" specifying that action is brought "on behalf of transgender Iowans who have been adversely impacted via numerous success State Actions" (ECF 1, p. 2); Wilson alleges that she brings the action "as a member of a class of persons protected against discrimination by the Civil Rights Act (id., p. 4); the Complaint alleges harms against transgender persons (id., pp. 9–13); and Wilson states that she is "one of the victims in this case" (id., p. 11). In other filings, Wilson states that she is transexual (*see* ECF 7, p. 5 n.1; ECF 7-2, p. 19 & n. 33), and orders in state court cases referenced by Wilson state that she is a transgender woman.

Nonetheless, Wilson does not identify any concrete injuries she has suffered as a result of Defendants' alleged violations. She claims that they violated "Congressionally created rights secured by the Medicaid and Medicare Act" but does not allege that she personally was wrongfully denied coverage under Medicare or Medicaid, that she was denied access to medically necessary procedures, or that medically necessary procedures were canceled or delayed—either in general or related to her gender identity. Similarly, as it relates to the recent passage of SF 418, Wilson does not allege that she planned to seek gender-affirming surgical procedures paid for by Iowa taxpayers (i.e., Medicaid) and is now prevented from doing so. She does not allege facts showing that she was discriminated against based on her gender identity. Nor does she show that she is "immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of the challenged conduct" or that the "threat of injury [is] both real and immediate." *McNaught*, 76 F.4th at 770 (cleaned up) (quoting *Smith v. Golden China of Red Wing, Inc*., 987 F.3d 1205, 1209 (8th Cir. 2021)). Accordingly, she lacks standing.

Wilson also fails to show that a favorable ruling will redress her complaints. "To determine whether an injury is redressable, a court will consider the relationship between 'the judicial relief requested' and the 'injury' suffered." *California v. Texas*, 593 U.S. 659, 671 (2021) (quoting *Allen v. Wright*, 468 U.S. 737, 753 n.19 (1984)). In Wilson's case, she asks the Court to "issue an

injunctive protective order to prevent any behind-the-scenes action targeting transgender persons." (ECF 1, p. 13). This request is too vague and too broad. It is not the type of request for judicial relief sufficient to confer standing. *See F.B. v. Our Lady of Lourdes Par. & Sch*., 125 F.4th 898, 904 (8th Cir. 2025) ("[T]he principle of separation of powers 'counsels against recognizing standing in a case brought, not to enforce specific legal obligations whose violation works a direct harm, but to seek a restructuring of the apparatus established by the Executive Branch to fulfill its legal duties.'" (quoting *Allen*, 468 U.S. at 761)).

Even if she had standing, Wilson's claims would fail as a matter of law. Her claims arise in part out of a state court lawsuit (Iowa District Court for Polk County, Case No. LACL157953) that she alleges was improperly dismissed, with Wilson further alleging that she was denied her right to appeal "based upon legal shenanigans." (ECF 1, p. 11.) This Court does not, however, have the authority to review state court rulings in circumstances like those present here. Moreover, to the extent Wilson is trying to bring claims against the judge in that case (Chief Judge Michael Huppert), he is entitled to judicial immunity. *Justice Network Inc. v. Craighead Cnty*., 931 F.3d 753, 759–60 (8th Cir. 2019). Judicial immunity is "not overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice." *Id*. (quoting *Mireles v. Waco*, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (per curiam)).

Granted, there are two narrow exceptions to the rule of judicial immunity. "First, a judge is not immune from liability for nonjudicial actions, *i.e*., actions not taken in the judge's judicial capacity. Second, a judge is not immune for actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction." *Id*. at 760 (quoting *Mireles*, 502 U.S. at 11–12). Neither of those exceptions is applicable here. Chief Judge Huppert was acting squarely within his judicial capacity when he ruled on Wilson's case, and thus she has not stated a plausible claim against him.

Wilson also pursues claims against Iowa elected officials and the Republican Party, ostensibly for passing laws adverse to transgender Iowans. The elected officials are, however, entitled to legislative immunity for their legislative acts, and the Republican Party cannot be liable under sections 1985 or 1986 or RICO conspiracy theories for supporting legislation that ends up being enacted. *See, e.g.*, *Church v. Missouri*, 913 F.3d 736, 751 (8th Cir. 2019) ("'[S]tate legislators enjoy common-law immunity from liability for their legislative acts.' . . . [and] 'officials outside the legislative branch are entitled to legislative immunity when they perform legislative functions.'" (quoting *Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union of U. S., Inc*., 446 U.S. 719, 732, (1980) and *Bogan v. Scott-Harris*, 523 U.S. 44, 55 (1998))). To the extent Wilson is seeking

injunctive relief against the legislation, her claims also fail as a matter of law because sections 1985 or 1986 and RICO are not the appropriate vehicles to do so. Wilson's Complaint is therefore DISMISSED. Her motion for leave to amend his DENIED AS FUTILE.

B. Supplement to Complaint.

On April 14, 2025, Wilson and her co-Plaintiffs—but identified in the caption as "the United States government, under the Authority of We the People, Prosecutor"—filed a "Criminal Complaint" against Defendants (and additional defendant Capitol Ministries) (ECF 2). The Criminal Complaint lists five charges: (1) conspiracy against rights, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 241; (2) deprivation of rights under color of law, in violation 18 U.S.C. § 242; (3) conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; (4) perjury, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1621; and (5) RICO, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–68. (ECF 2, pp. 2–4.) Plaintiffs allege substantially the same facts in support of each charge (id., pp. 5–10), asserting that Defendants have violated the rights of transgender persons, including access to medically necessary care and protection against discrimination (id., pp. 10–12). They further allege that Defendants swore an oath of office to uphold the state and/or United States Constitution, and their failure to uphold that oath constitutes a violation of the perjury statute. (Id., p. 13.)

At the outset, Plaintiffs do not have the authority to initiate criminal actions. This is the prerogative of elected or appointed officials in the Executive Branch. Moreover, federal criminal statutes generally do not provide a private right of action anyway. *See, e.g.*, *Frison v. Zebro*, 339 F.3d 994, 999–1000 (8th Cir. 2003). With respect to the first four statutes listed above, even if Plaintiffs had properly alleged Defendants violated these statutes, they are criminal in nature and do not confer a private right of action. *See United States v. Wadena*, 152 F.3d 831, 846 (8th Cir. 1998) ("Courts repeatedly have held that there is no private right of action under § 241, even though the statute allows federal authorities to pursue criminal charges."); *Newton v. Compass Health Network*, No. 4:22-CV-239 AGF, 2022 WL 1154522, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 19, 2022) (no private right of action as to both section 241 and 242, and collecting cases); *Deuerlein v. Nebraska Child Protective Servs*., 793 F. App'x 468 (8th Cir. 2020) (no private right of action under 18 U.S.C. § 371); *Kapacs v. Brunsell*, No. 18-CV-3089 (NEB/ECW), 2018 WL 6977600, at *4 (D. Minn. Nov. 6, 2018) (no private right of action under 18 U.S.C. § 1621), *report and recommendation adopted*, No. 18-CV-3089 (NEB/ECW), 2019 WL 121252 (D. Minn. Jan. 7, 2019).

In addition to those problems, the Supplement suffers from the same fatal problems as the Complaint: elected official Defendants are entitled to legislative immunity; Chief Judge Huppert is entitled to judicial immunity; and the Court does not have authority under the federal statutes identified in the Supplement to issue injunctive relief. Thus, the Supplement (Criminal Complaint) is DISMISSED.

C. Motion for Extraordinary Writ.

On April 14, 2025, Plaintiff Sondra Wilson filed a document titled "Suit at Equity, Law, and Prosecution" which the Court refers to as the Motion for Extraordinary Writ. (ECF 3.) In this filing, Plaintiffs purport to provide notice of the suit to Defendants and identify the following groups as Petitioner-Plaintiffs: homeless persons, transgender persons, duressed persons, persons with abortion rights, and "other classes TBA." Id., pp. 5–6.) Wilson identifies herself as the drafter of the pleadings but acknowledges she is not a lawyer, although she does claim to qualified to manage the lawsuit and serve as Authorized Representative. (Id., p. 7.) She also requests to redact certain documents (ECF 3, p. 5; ECF 5) and to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF 3, pp. 9, 10; ECF 4).

The Court DENIES Wilson's request to redact the Complaint. (ECF 5.) The Court will, however, GRANT Wilson's Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis, as she appears to qualify for IFP status. (ECF 4.)

D. Omnibus Motion.

The final filing the Court must address is Wilson's "Omnibus Motion," which had several requests for relief including: a request for a preliminary injunction; a request to stay a pending case in the Iowa District Court for Story County; and a request to "join" the Story County case with this case. (ECF 7.) Wilson also requests to have access to victim's services through the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") and to be allowed to file electronically. (Id.) The "Omnibus Motion" also identifies an additional plaintiff—Kevin Byrd—and many additional Defendants, whom she classifies as "Sets of Defendants" by location and/or date. Although she does not allege specific facts related to most newly added Defendants, Plaintiff explains that: "[s]ex-based discrimination and unfounded discriminatory presumption made against homeless persons have been the primary motivations of all Sets of Defendants named and alluded to herein, and the homelessness I've experienced for more than 20 years has been caused by the Defendants." (Id., p. 5 n.1.)

The dismissal of Wilson's underlying claims makes her requests in the "Omnibus Motion" moot. Even if the filing is interpreted as an amended complaint, however, dismissal would be required. Like her original pleadings, Wilson's "Omnibus Motion" has not stated plausible claims for relief. As to the Story County case, for example, the Court does not have freestanding authority to stay or review rulings in a state court case, nor is there any mechanism for "joining" a state court case with a federal court case. *See Cook v. Hinrichs*, 500 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1227 (D.S.D. 2007) (dismissing mandamus action against state actors because federal district court "has no authority to compel action by state officers, including state judicial officers"). Further, principles of comity would require this Court to abstain from hearing a claim that hinges on a state court's or agency's decision-making until the state court proceeding has been resolved. *See Rizzo v. Goode*, 423 U.S. 362, 378 (1976) ("Where, as here, the exercise of authority by state officials is attacked, federal courts must be constantly mindful of the special delicacy of the adjustment to be preserved between federal equitable power and State administration of its own law." (quotation omitted)); *see also Dixon v. City of St. Louis*, 950 F.3d 1052, 1056 (8th Cir. 2020) ("We note that '[t]his principle of comity takes on special force when federal courts are asked to decide how state courts should conduct their business.'" (quoting *Courthouse News Serv. v. Brown*, 908 F.3d 1063, 1074 (7th Cir. 2018))), *as corrected* (Mar. 23, 2020). The Court similarly lacks authority to dictate to Executive Branch officials at the state or federal level who they may (or may not) pardon, nor does a viable cause of action arise simply because a plaintiff disagrees on policy grounds with an Executive Order. Finally, the Court has no authority to provide financial assistance (other than granting in forma pauperis status) or force the FBI to provide victim's services. Accordingly, the "Omnibus Motion" must be dismissed along with the remainder of Wilson's pleadings.

III. CONCLUSION.

Plaintiff's Complaint (ECF 1) and Supplement (ECF 2) are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The Court GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (ECF 4). The Court DENIES Plaintiff's Motion to Redact Complaint (ECF 5), Motion for Preliminary Injunction (ECF 7), Motion to Stay (ECF 8), Motion for Joinder (ECF 9), Motion for Access to Victims Services (ECF 10), and Motion to File Electronically (ECF 11).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 23, 2025

STEPHEN H. LOCHER
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE